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Abstract
To provide reliable, accurate, and timely wireless network security, this work
introduces a Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantized Improved (GRLVQI)
classification process and extends applicability of RF “Distinct Native Attribute”
(RF-DNA) fingerprinting for device classification (a one-to-many looks “most like”
assessment) and device identity verification (a one-to-one looks “how much like” as-
sessment). Transition to the GRLVQI process was motivated by earlier RF-DNA fin-
gerprinting work that used a Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML) classification process. Although successful, the earlier MDA/ML works
are inherently limited in that they provide no capability for determining which RF-
DNA features are most important to classification or identification–GRLVQI inher-
ently provides a feature relevance indication and overcomes this limitation.
GRLVQI feature relevance ranking is exploited here to enable Dimensional Re-
duction Analysis (DRA) and enhance the experimental-to-operational transition po-
tential of RF-DNA fingerprinting, i.e., identify the minimum number of required RF-
DNA features to achieve desired classification and verification performance. This is
done using RF-DNA features extracted from 2D (time-frequency) Gabor Transform
(GT) responses of experimentally collected emissions from Orthogonal Frequency Di-
vision Multiplexing (OFDM) based 802.16 Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access (WiMAX) and 802.11 WiFi devices. Performance using 2D GT-based RF-
DNA features proves superior relative to demonstrations using 1D Time Domain
(TD), 1D Spectral Domain (SD) and 2D Dual-Tree Complex Wavelet Transform (DT-
CWT) features.
Using GT-based RF-DNA fingerprints and the GRLVQI classifier, demonstra-
tions here include average classification accuracy of %C≥90% using 1) 204 full di-
mensional features from WiMAX emissions at SNR≥10.0 dB, and 2) 363 full dimen-
iv
sional features from WiFi emissions at SNR≥12.0 dB. Performance with DRA≈90%
dimensionally-reduced feature sets (top ranked 10% of the most relevant features re-
tained) included %C≥90% using only 1) 20 of 204 WiMAX features at SNR≥12.0 dB
and 2) 36 of 363 WiFi features at SNR≥13.0 dB. Collectively, this corresponds to
a 1.0 to 2.0 dB trade-off in required SNR to achieve a given %C with an apprecia-
ble reduction in required computational resources. For device ID verification using
the same DRA≈ 90% GT-based RF-DNA fingerprints, GRLVQI effectively enabled:
1) 100% ID verification of all six authorized WiMAX devices while detecting 97%
(35 of 36 attempts) of spoofing attacks by unauthorized rogue WiMAX devices at
SNR=18.0 dB, and 2) 100% ID verification of all four authorized WiFi devices at
SNR=15.0 dB; rogue WiFi device detection was not assessed due to available data
limitations and remains an area of interest for future research.
v
Acknowledgements
I owe a large debt of gratitude to my research advisor, Dr. Michael Temple,
for his patience, guidance, and support throughout this research effort. The tech-
nical expertise and advice were insightful, motivational, and immensely appreciated.
Throughout this entire effort you have served as a trusted advisor not only technically
but also personally and for that I am truly grateful.
I would also like to thank my wife, because without her love, constant encour-
agement, understanding, and support none of this would have been possible.
Donald R. Reising
vi
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
List of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Operational Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Technical Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 RF Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2 Device Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 Device ID Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Signals of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.1 IEEE 802.16e WiMAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 IEEE 802.11a WiFi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 RF-DNA Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 1D Time Domain (TD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 1D Spectral Domain (SD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.3 2D Joint Time-Frequency (T-F) Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Device Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.1 MDA/ML Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 GRLVQI Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Device ID Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
III. Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Signal Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Post-Collection Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.1 Digital Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.2 Burst Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
vii
Page
3.2.3 Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) Scaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Training and Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.1 MDA/ML Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.2 GRLVQI Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Device Bit-Level ID Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5.1 MDA/ML Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5.2 GRLVQI Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
IV. Device Classification and ID Verification Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1 IEEE 802.16e WiMAX Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1.1 Full-Dimensional WiMAX Classification: MDA/ML . . . . . . 50
4.1.2 Full-Dimensional WiMAX Classification: GRLVQI . . . . . . 51
4.1.3 DRA Impact on WiMAX Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1.4 WiMAX Device ID Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 IEEE 802.11a WiFi Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2.1 Full-Dimensional WiFi Classification: MDA/ML . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.2 Full-Dimensional WiFi Classification: GRLVQI . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.3 DRA Impact on WiFi Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2.4 WiFi Device ID Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Multipath Impact on Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
V. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.1 Research Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2 Research Contribution Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2.1 2D Gabor-Based RF-DNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2.2 Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2.3 Device ID Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 Sponsor Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Appendix A. Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A.1 WiMAX Device ID Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A.2 WiFi Device ID Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
viii
List of Figures
Figure Page
1.1 Multi-Layer OSI Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Three Observed 802.16e WiMAX MS Transmissions . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Expanded View of “Near-transient” Region of WiMAX Range-Only
Magnitude Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 First 25 µs of an 802.11a WiFi Burst Response with the Preamble
Spanning the First 16.5 µs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Regional Fingerprint Generation Using RF-DNA Statistical Fea-
tures Extracted from NR+1 Total Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Gabor-Based RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation Using a Total ofNT×NF
2-D Patches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Representative MDA Projection from NC=3 Class Inputs to Two
Possible NC−1=2D Subspaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.7 GRLVQI Classification Process Showing Unknown Fingerprint (f̂)
Being Assigned to Class Ci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Signal Collection and Post-Collection Processing . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Overlay of WiMAXGT Relevance Rankings (λBi ) for a Full-Dimensional
Nf=204 Feature Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Overlay of Highest Relevance Values from Each of the Four DRA
Methods Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4 In-Class and Out-of-Class PMFs for an Arbitrary Test Statistic Us-
ing a Traditional Threshold Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 In-Class and Out-of-Class PMFs for an Arbitrary Test Statistic Us-
ing a Modified Threshold Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6 Percent Correct (True) and Incorrect (False) ID Verification vs.
Threshold Width (η) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.7 ROC Curve and EER Point for True Verification Rate (TVR) vs.
False Verification Rate (FVR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Full-Dimensional WiMAXMDA/ML Classification Performance: TD,
SD, GT and GWT RF-DNA Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
ix
Figure Page
4.2 Full-Dimensional WiMAX GRLVQI MDA/ML Classification Per-
formance: TD, SD, GT and GWT RF-DNA Features . . . . . . . . 54
4.3 WiMAX Cross-Device Average Classification Comparison: MDA/ML
and GRLVQI Using GT RF-DNA Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 WiMAX GRLVQI λi Relevance Values: Highest Ranked 10% and
Second-Highest Ranked 10% at SNR=12.0 dB . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5 WiMAX DRA: Full-Dimensional vs. Highest Ranked 10%, Highest
Ranked 20%, and Second-Highest Ranked 10% Features . . . . . . 58
4.6 Gabor T-F Responses for NC=6 WiMAX Devices: Patch Locations
for Highest Ranked 10% (Top 20) Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.7 WiMAXGRLVQI and MDA/ML Device Classification Performance:
DRA Method #1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.8 WiMAXGRLVQI and MDA/ML Device Classification Performance:
DRA Method #2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.9 WiMAXGRLVQI and MDA/ML Device Classification Performance:
DRA Method #3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.10 WiMAXGRLVQI and MDA/ML Device Classification Performance:
DRA Method #4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.11 WiMAXGRLVQI and MDA/ML Device Classification Performance:
Full-Dimensional Versus All Four DRA Methods . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.12 MDA/MLWiMAX Verification ROC Curves: Norm Posterior Prob-
ability Statistic, GT RF-DNA Features at SNR = 6.0 dB . . . . . 68
4.13 MDA/ML WiMAX Verification ROC Curves: Best and Worst Case
Devices, GT RF-DNA Features, Varying SNR . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.14 GRLVQI WiMAX Verification ROC Curves: Authorized Devices,
GT Features at SNR=18.0 dB, Four Similarity Measures . . . . . 71
4.15 GRLVQI WiMAX Verification ROC Curves: Rogue Devices, GT
Features at SNR=18.0 dB, Four Similarity Measures . . . . . . . . 73
4.16 GRLVQI WiMAX Verification ROC Curves: NRC=6 Rogue Devices
Falsifying IDs of NAC=6 Authorized Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.17 WiFi MDA/ML Full-Dimensional Device Classification: TD, SD,
GT and GWT RF-DNA Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
x
Figure Page
4.18 WiFi MDA/ML Average Classification Performance: TD, SD, GT,
and GWT from Fig. 4.17 and DT-CWT from [57] . . . . . . . . . 78
4.19 WiFi GRLVQI Full-Dimensional Device Classification: TD, SD, GT
and GWT RF-DNA Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.20 WiFi GRLVQI Average Classification Performance: TD, SD, GT,
and GWT from Fig. 4.19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.21 WiFi Classifier Comparison: Fig. 4.18 MDA/ML and Fig. 4.20 GR-
LVQI Averages Using GT RF-DNA Features . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.22 WiFi Gabor T-F Responses for NC=4 Authorized Devices: Patch
Locations for Highest Ranked 10% (Top 36) Features . . . . . . . . 83
4.23 WiFi GRLVQI and MDA/ML Classification Performance: DRA
Method #3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.24 WiFi GRLVQI and MDA/ML Classifier Comparison: Average Cross-
Device Performance Using DRA Method #3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.25 WiFi GRLVQI Verification ROC Curves: NAC=4 Authorized De-
vices, GT RF-DNA Features at SNR=15.0 dB . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.26 WiFi GRLVQI Verification ROC Curves: Best and Worst Case De-
vices, Top 36 GT RF-DNA Features, Varying SNR . . . . . . . . 87
4.27 Rayleigh Faded Multipath Model: Direct Path LOS Signal Plus One
Random Reflected Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.28 Rayleigh Faded Multipath Channel Characteristics . . . . . . . . . 90
4.29 MDA/ML Multipath Assessment Using GT and GWT 802.11a WiFi
Signal Features at SNR=18.0 dB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.30 MDA/MLMultipath Impact Assessment Using GT and GWT 802.11a
WiFi Signal Features at SNR=15.0 dB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.31 MDA/MLMultipath Impact Assessment Using GT and GWT 802.11a
WiFi Signal Features at SNR=9.0 dB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.1 ROC curves and EER for four WiMAXMS devices at SNR=[0, 3, 6] dB
using an a posterior probability verification test statistic zv. . . . . 105
A.2 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MS9993 at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv 106
xi
Figure Page
A.3 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSC2FF at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.106
A.4 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAB9 at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.107
A.5 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAC5 at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.107
A.6 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDDBF at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.108
A.7 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MS9993 at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.8 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSC2FF at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A.9 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAB9 at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A.10 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAC5 at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A.11 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDDBF at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A.12 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MS9993 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv. . . 111
A.13 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSC2FF at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv. . . 111
A.14 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAB9 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv. . . 112
A.15 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAC5 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv. . . 112
xii
Figure Page
A.16 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDDBF at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv. . . 113
A.17 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MS9993 at
SNR=18 dB using the a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean
Distance verification test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.18 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSC2FF at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Dis-
tance verification test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.19 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAB9 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Dis-
tance verification test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.20 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAC5 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Dis-
tance verification test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A.21 ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDDBF at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Dis-
tance verification test statistic zv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
xiii
List of Tables
Table Page
1.1 Previous Work vs Current Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Verification Outcomes & Rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Digital Filter Parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 GRLVQI Classifier Parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 Verification Outcomes & Rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1 Model Development (M) and RF-DNA Fingerprint Testing (T) Con-
ditions for (M#,T#) Multipath Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
xiv
List of Symbols
Symbol Page
TF TDD Frame Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
WCh RF Channel Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
fc Center Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
NO Number of OFDM Sub-carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
fTD Time Domain RF-DNA Fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Ns Number of Digital Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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Exploitation of RF-DNA for Device
Classification and Verification
Using GRLVQI Processing
I. Introduction
T
his chapter introduces the dissertation research and its documentation. The
operational and technical motivation for conducting the research is provided
in Section 1.1 and Section 1.2, respectively. Section 1.2 contains three subsections,
including a summary of related work in RF fingerprinting in Section 1.2.1, device
classification in Section 1.2.2, and device ID verification in Section 1.2.3. A relational
mapping between prior related research and research contributions of this disserta-
tion is provided in Section 1.3, followed by a document organization overview in
Section 1.4.
1.1 Operational Motivation
Historically, opportunistic “hackers” have routinely gained unauthorized access
to wireless networks and their malicious activities are expected to continue as new
technologies emerge [10,11,15]. Given the ubiquity of Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing (OFDM) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
standards governing the following operations,
1. IEEE 802.11a/g Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) operation [51],
2. IEEE 802.16 Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) oper-
ation [50,52], and
3. 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE) oper-
ation [4, 5],
the threat of unauthorized network access remains a concern for OFDM-based wireless
networks. This is especially true when considering that WiFi, WiMAX and LTE
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networks commonly provide user access through Wireless Access Points (WAP)–one
of the top 10 Information Technology (IT) security threats [2].
The concern is even greater when considering applications in which these net-
works form critical links in an overall system architecture. Some architectures in
which OFDM-based wireless networks are deployed, or being considered for deploy-
ment, include:
1. Home area WiFi and neighborhood area WiMAX networks in support of Smart
Grid maintenance and operation [61,91].
2. Cloud computing connectivity to facilitate user access to data anywhere at any-
time [28]. In cloud-connected wireless networks the end users surrender protec-
tive custody of their data; therefore, it is imperative that only authorized users
be granted access. This is even more critical when considering the potential
number of peripherally connected subnetworks operating at or near the “edge”
of a larger cloud infrastructure.
3. Industrial Control System (ICS), Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA), Energy Management System (EMS), and other critical infrastruc-
ture elements. The backbone and/or backhaul communication for these type of
systems is commonly based on the IEEE WiMAX standards and their security
is paramount to national security [61, 80].
4. Other public safety applications such as the WiMAX-based AeroMAX network
being developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Eurocontrol,
and International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO) to support next gen-
eration airport communication services [32, 37].
Services provided within wireless networks are characterized and standardized
by the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model that is comprised of seven layers as
shown in Fig. 1.1. Security and detection of unauthorized users has been traditionally
addressed within higher “bit-level” layers of the OSI model, e.g., Network (NWK) and
Data Link (DLL) layers. This includes a considerable amount of research conducted
2
Figure 1.1: Multi-layer Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) network model [1, 3].
on bit-level security mechanisms to detect and/or mitigate unauthorized network
access [17,60,65,78,85,96]. By design, these higher layer bit-level security approaches
inherently ignore the Physical (PHY) layer –the WAP “doorway” through which a
majority of malicious activity occurs. Neglecting the PHY layer fails to leverage
potentially useful information contained within wireless network Radio Frequency
(RF) emissions.
RF fingerprinting is one method that leverages potentially discriminating PHY
layer information by exploiting unique features that are 1) unintentionally imparted
on RF emissions by hardware components comprising the wireless device, and 2) dif-
ficult for unauthorized users to mimic and replicate. RF fingerprints facilitate dis-
crimination between multiple devices, establishment of a device’s identity (ID), and
mitigation of unauthorized network access. This research investigates the exploita-
tion of PHY layer attributes (i.e., RF fingerprints) as a means for augmenting bit-level
security mechanisms to 1) improve authorized user verification, and 2) increase de-
tection of unauthorized devices attempting to gain network access. Previous research
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has shown that PHY layer attributes can be useful in the identification of wireless
devices and provide a means of augmenting current bit-level network security mech-
anisms. Section 1.2 provides a summary of previously investigated RF fingerprinting
techniques that utilize PHY layer attributes to accomplish this goal.
1.2 Technical Motivation
A considerable amount of research has been conducted in the area of RF fin-
gerprinting over the past two decades [23–25, 27, 31, 33, 36, 38–41, 44, 45, 47, 49, 54,
56–58, 67, 71–76, 81, 84, 86, 88, 89, 93–95]. These works have predominalty investi-
gated the use of RF fingerprints for device classification (a one-to-many looks “most
like” assessment) using various wireless communication devices, including: IEEE
802.11 WiFi [44, 45, 47, 54, 56, 57, 67, 73, 81, 84], Global System for Mobile Commu-
nications (GSM) cellular phones [75, 93], IEEE 802.16 WiMAX [71–73, 76, 94], IEEE
802.15 Bluetooth [40], and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) [23,95]. The work
in [44, 45, 47, 56–58, 71–73, 76, 81, 93, 94] focused on inherent PHY layer benefits that
leverage RF ‘Distinct Native Attributes’ (RF-DNA) extracted from specific portions
of modulated signal responses to achieve serial number discrimination. In this context,
RF-DNA attributes are 1) sufficiently “distinct” to facilitate persistent cross-device
discrimination and 2) “native” in that variations due to hardware implementation,
component type, manufacturing processes and/or environmental interactions impart
unintentional “coloration” upon the modulated waveform that enable device discrim-
ination.
1.2.1 RF Fingerprinting. While a considerable body of knowledge has been
established within the area of RF-DNA fingerprinting, there remained a need at the
onset of this research to improve the experimental-to-operational transition potential
of RF-DNA fingerprinting and facilitate successful fielding of a system to provide reli-
able and robust PHY layer security augmentation. The envisioned network addition,
designated here as an RF “Air Monitor”, must be able to discriminate between 1) de-
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vices from different manufacturers (inter-manufacturer discrimination), 2) dissimilar
model devices from the same manufacturer (intra-manufacturer discrimination), and
3) like model devices from the same manufacturer (intra-manufacturer serial number
discrimination). As repeatedly demonstrated, intra-manufacturer serial number dis-
crimination presents the greatest challenge [44,47,57,76,93,94] and three approaches
that can be used to improve overall classification performance, include:
1. Discovering a more robust feature set for use with a given classifier, where in-
creased robustness enables use of a single, minimal dimension feature set under
multiple channel conditions (Gaussian, Rayleigh, etc.) and/or multiple device
combinations (inter-manufacturer and intra-manufacturer conditions).
2. Developing a more powerful classifier for a given feature set, where increased
power is indicated by either 1) requiring a lower SNR to achieve a given clas-
sification level, or 2) achieving a higher classification level for a given SNR.
3. A combination thereof.
To improve RF-DNA fingerprinting classification performance, related work
in [56–58] investigated the use of an alternate feature set generated from 2D Dual-
Tree Complex Wavelet Transform (DT-CWT) coefficients; the first successful tran-
sition from 1D Time Domain (TD) and 1D Spectral Domain (SD) feature sets to
a 2D joint Time-Frequency (T-F) feature set. The DT-CWT exploits momentary
and/or time localized signal energy changes as a function of frequency [55]. Using
preamble responses from 802.11a wireless signals, results in [56–58] show that classifi-
cation performance using 2D DT-CWT T-F features is superior when compared with
results using 1D TD or SD features. However, the T-F resolution trade-off present
in the DT-CWT (i.e., increasing time resolution decreases frequency resolution and
visa-versa) was deemed as being potentially limiting.
Among the list of alternative 2D feature spaces initially considered are the
linear Gabor Transform (GT), non-linear Gabor-Wigner Transform (GWT) [18, 83],
the Fractional Fourier Transform (FrFT) [14, 16, 66, 69], the S-Transform [79], the
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Chirplet [63], and the Cohen class of T-F distributions (e.g., Choi-Williams Trans-
form) [21]. GT and GWT feature sets ultimately became the focus for detailed proof-
of-concept demonstration given:
1. They both mitigate potentially adverse T-F resolution trade-off effects,
2. They both have been successfully used for assessing power line quality and
detecting anomalous signal behavior [18, 83],
3. Technical community “encouragement” to consider both linear and non-linear
transforms and assess potential benefits of RF-DNA fingerprinting when oper-
ating in multipath environments.
Section 2.2.3 provides a detailed description of the GT and GWT implementa-
tions considered here [9, 59, 92], along with RF-DNA fingerprint generation improve-
ments that were required to process complex 2D T-F data.
1.2.2 Device Classification. Numerous classification methods exist within
the pattern recognition community, with some of the most popular including Fisher’s
Linear Discriminant (FLD), K-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), Support Vector Machine
(SVM), and simple cross-correlation techniques [40, 57, 82, 88, 94, 95]. The RF-DNA
fingerprinting research in [57, 71, 74–76, 81, 93, 94] used the Fisher-based MDA/ML
classifier to perform Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) feature selection followed
by Maximum Likelihood (ML) device discrimination using previously unseen data.
It is also important to note that specialized classification techniques have seen little
advancement [57]. Therefore, if a more robust set of 2D T-F features (e.g., DT-CWT,
GT, GWT, etc.) is combined with a more powerful classifier, it is expected that
classification performance will improve.
While performing favorably in works cited previously using various signals of
interest, there are some inherent drawbacks to the MDA/ML classifier, including:
1. The dimensionality of the NC-dimensional input feature set is reduced through
projection to a lower (NC − 1)-dimensional subspace with a goal of maximizing
6
inter-class separation and minimizing intra-class spread. Through MDA feature
selection, inherent input information is discarded through projection and the
ability to identify significant input features, i.e., those having greatest impact
on class separation and classification accuracy, is inherently lost;
2. MDA feature selection is performed independently of subsequent ML classifica-
tion. This can lead to an undesirable effect of decreased classification accuracy
when using a reduced dimensional feature set relative to what may be achievable
using a full-dimensional feature set [64];
3. For ML classification, there is either 1) knowledge of the statistical distribution
of each class’ inputs, or 2) an assumption made on the statistical distribu-
tions. Traditionally, this includes assuming each class’ inputs are normally dis-
tributed with equal costs and uniform prior probabilities [57, 74–76, 81, 93, 94].
However, specific knowledge of the distribution of each class’ inputs may be
unknown and the assumed normal condition may be violated under practical
conditions (i.e., burst-to-burst signal variation, channel conditions, operating
environments, etc.);
4. It has been suggested that the success of machine learning approaches (e.g.,
MDA/ML classification) is adversely affected by factors such as noisy or unre-
liable data, or irrelevant or redundant information [42].
Given noted MDA/ML drawbacks, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) re-
searchers have recently considered two alternate classifiers, including: 1) an Artificial
Neural Network (ANN)-based Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-
Improved (GRLVQI) process [43, 64], and 2) a Learning From Signals (LFS) process
that is being jointly developed with researchers from Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory (ORNL) researchers [14, 44, 46, 47]. While both methods inherently overcome
all MDA/ML drawbacks to some extent, the ability of GRLVQI and LFS to support
Dimension Reduction Analysis (DRA) provides the greatest benefit, i.e., these meth-
ods inherently provide a means for identifying and retaining a reduced subset of most
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relevant features contained in the full-dimensional feature set. The goal is to find a
DRA reduced-dimensional subset that maintains a given classification performance
and minimizes required computational resources.
Given the relative maturity of GRLVQI, it was adopted under this research as
the process of choice for increasing classifier power. The increased “power” of this
classifier rests not only in the potential for improving overall classification perfor-
mance, but also in the fact that it provides a mechanism for determining which input
features are most significant–a key deficiency of the MDA/ML classifier. Specific
advantages of GRLVQI relative to MDA/ML drawbacks include [43,64]:
1. Most importantly, a relevance ranking is assigned to each feature comprising an
input RF-DNA fingerprint–a direct measure relating input feature significance
to the overall classification decision.
2. Feature selection is performed in conjunction with classification.
3. No inherent assumption nor actual knowledge required on input data distribu-
tion (i.e., Gaussian, Rayleigh, etc.).
4. Processing is well-suited for cases where the number of input features may be
inconsistent across classes, or where the inputs are comprised of noisy or incon-
sistent data.
Additional details on GRLVQI processing are provided in Section 2.3.2 and
Section 3.3.2. Comparative classification performance results using RF-DNA based
on traditional 1D TD and 1D SD features, as well as features based on joint 2D T-F
responses are presented in Chapter IV.
1.2.3 Device ID Verification. Traditionally, RF-DNA fingerprint research
has predominantly focused on device classification (a one-to-many looks “most like”
assessment) [44,47,57,74–76,81,93,94]. In this case, the network “air monitor” would
perform a “one-to-many” comparison to determine an unknown device’s identity. This
is done by comparing the current “challenge” RF-DNA from the unknown device to
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the reference models stored for each of the known authorized network devices. Tra-
ditionally, in device classification the unknown device’s “challenge” fingerprints will
be assigned, by the classifier, as belonging to one of the known classes. This assign-
ment is made regardless of whether or not the “challenge” RF-DNA originated from
an authorized (i.e., reference model on hand) or unknown (i.e., no stored reference
model) device. This leads to a final classification decision being made based upon a
“best-match” criteria, where the best-match may actually be a poor match. Also, this
“one-to-many” comparison may not be practical in all applications, including those
where the air monitor supports a network comprised of a large number of devices and
timely, accurate authentication is required. The challenge becomes even greater when
considering networks where users enter and leave frequently or randomly (e.g., public
WiFi hot spots, cellular-based networks, etc.).
This research adopted the verification procedures used in [19, 20] for uninten-
tional emissions from electronic devices and applies them to intentional emissions from
wireless devices to perform device ID verification (a one-to-one looks “how much like”
assessment). This process involves a “one-to-one” comparison of the device’s cur-
rent RF-DNA fingerprint with a stored reference model associated with that device’s
digitally claimed bit-level identity; common digital identifiers include the Medium
Access Control (MAC) address, Electronic Serial Number (ESN), International Mo-
bile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number and the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
number. As commonly done in network applications, verification results in [19, 20]
and Chapter IV. results here are presented using Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves and corresponding Equal Error Rate (EER) to characterize device ID
verification capability, with EER being the point at which False Reject Rate (FRR)
equals False Accept Rate (FAR) [24, 53]. A more detailed description of device ID
verification is presented in Section 2.4 and Section 3.5.
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1.3 Research Contributions
Table 1.1 provides a summary of the technical areas identified in the previ-
ous sections, along with a relational mapping between “Previous Work” (pre-existing
knowledge base) and contributions of the “Current Research” (knowledge base ex-
pansions) that are presented in this dissertation.
Table 1.1: Relational mapping between Technical Areas in Previous related work and
Current research contributions. The × symbol denotes areas addressed.
Technical Area Previous Work Current Research
Addressed Ref # Addressed Ref #
TD Fingerprinting ×
[23, 41, 56, 57]
× [74–76]
[81, 82, 93, 94]
SD Fingerprinting × [94] × [76]
DT-CWT Fingerprinting × [56–58]
GT/GWT Fingerprinting × [45, 71–73,76]
Signal Type/Modulation
802.11/OFDM × [56–58,94] × [45, 73]
GSM/GMSK × [93] × [74, 75]
802.16e/OFDMA × [94] × [71, 73, 76]
Device Classification
GRLVQI × [56, 57] × [45, 72, 73]
LFS × [12–14,44, 46, 47] × [45]
Dimension Reduction Analysis (DRA)
GRLVQI × [56, 57] × [45, 72, 73]
LFS × [45]
Device ID Verification
Electronic Components × [19, 20]
Authorized Wireless Devices × [72, 73]
Rogue Wireless Devices × [72, 73]
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1.4 Document Organization
This document is organized as follows. Chapter II provides details on technical
topics and literature related to OFDM-based WiMAX and WiFi signal implementa-
tion, RF signal collection, post-collection processing, RF-DNA fingerprinting, device
classification, and device ID verification. Chapter III outlines the methodology used
during the research to collect, process, generate fingerprints, and subsequently identify
and/or verify IEEE 802.16e WiMAX and 802.11a WiFi devices. Chapter IV presents
TD, SD, GT, and GWT device classification performance for the MDA/ML and GR-
LVQI classifiers, as well as authorized and “rogue” device verification performance
for the investigated signal types. Lastly, concluding comments and envisioned future
research activity is presented in Chapter V.
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II. Background
T
his chapter provides a summary of necessary technical concepts used in develop-
ing the research methodology presented in Chapter III, as well as generation of
results presented in Chapter IV. Section 2.1 provides a description of the signals of in-
terest which include IEEE compliant Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) and Worldwide Interop-
erability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) signals. Section 2.2 provides a description of
RF-DNA fingerprint generation based on three specific responses, including 1D Time
Domain (TD), 1D Spectral Domain (SD), and 2D joint (T-F) domain. Device classi-
fication using Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) and
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) processes
is presented in Section 2.3. The chapter concludes with Section 2.4 which describes
the device ID verification process.
2.1 Signals of Interest
2.1.1 IEEE 802.16e WiMAX. An Alvarion BreezeMAX Extreme 5000 IEEE
802.16e WiMAX network using 60/40 Time Division Duplexing (TDD) was used for
experimental demonstration. The first 60% of the TF=5ms TDD frame was allocated
for Base Transciever Station (BTS) Down-Link (DL) transmission and the remaining
40% allocated for Mobile Subscriber (MS) Up-Link (UL) transmission [7]. The RF
channel occupied a bandwidth of WCh=5 MHz centered at fc=5475 MHz. Figure 2.1
presents magnitude plots for three distinct UL sub-frame responses that were observed
during experimentation. As indicated, these are designated asData-Only, Range-Plus-
Data, and Range-Only mode responses [76]. These MS “operating modes” were not
apparent in any Alvarion or supplemental documentation. When an MS transmits in
the Range-Plus-Data or Range-Only modes, the ranging portion of the UL subframe
is used for intial network setup, synchronization, BTS-to-BTS handover, resolution of
bandwidth contention, as well as timing and frequency offset calculation [22, 50, 52].
All subsequent discussion as well as results presented in Chapter IV are based upon
the tested MS operating in the Range-Only mode.
12
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(a) MS Data Only sub-frame response.
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(b) MS Range-Plus-Data sub-frame response.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
0
2
4
6
8
10
M
a
g
n
it
u
d
e
(m
V
)
Time (ms)
(c) MS Range Only sub-frame response.
Figure 2.1: Three distinct UL sub-frame magnitude responses for “operating modes”
of BreezeMAX 802.16e WiMAX MS transmissions [76].
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Unlike previously investigated GSM and 802.11 signals [57, 58, 74, 75, 93], the
collected mobile 802.16e WiMAX MS signals lack a distinct portion of the modulated
waveform that remains consistent across all devices. However, all of the observed MS
responses contained a device power up bias that spanned the UL sub-frame. This
power up bias is most apparent in Fig. 2.1(c) and is expanded upon in Fig. 2.2. It
is believed that the bias is incorporated by design to stabilize electronic component
response and mitigate adverse peak-to-average power ratio effects that frequently
occur in OFDM. An approximate 14.0 µs interval (2.0 µs to 16.0 µs) of the UL
sub-frame response is designated here as the “near-transient” response. This “near-
transient” response in Fig. 2.2 has thus far resulted in the most useful RF-DNA for
WiMAX MS device classification and verification [71, 76].
2.1.2 IEEE 802.11a WiFi. IEEE 802.11a WiFi is an OFDM signal com-
prised of NO=52 sub-carriers with a channel bandwidth of WCh=16.6 MHz centered
at fc=5745.2 MHz [51]. The 802.11a signal specification requires that each RF trans-
mission include a distinctive preamble at the beginning. This distinct preamble is
comprised of 10 short and 2 long training sequences. Networked devices use these se-
quences to assist in diversity selection, timing and frequency acquisition, and channel
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Figure 2.2: Expanded view of “near-transient” region of Range-Only magnitude re-
sponse, of Fig. 2.1(c), showing the device power up bias present within the UL sub-
frame [76].
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Figure 2.3: First 25 µs of an 802.11a WiFi burst (major portion of payload omitted).
The preamble spans the first 16.5 µs [73].
estimation [51]. In this work, the signals used for experimental demonstration were
collected from two laptops using Cisco AIR-CB21G-A-K9 WiFi cards operating as a
peer-to-peer Ad hoc wireless network. Figure 2.3 illustrates the preamble, comprising
the first 16.0 µs, of a 802.11a WiFi transmission from which RF-DNA fingerprints
are extracted for subsequent device discrimination.
2.2 RF-DNA Fingerprinting
This work investigates the application of RF-DNA fingerprinting using features
based on 1D Time Domain (TD), 1D Spectral Domain (SD), and 2D joint Time-
Frequency (T-F) responses.
2.2.1 1D Time Domain (TD). As in [44,47,74–76,81,94], this work used RF-
DNA fingerprints extracted from instantaneous TD amplitude, phase, and frequency
responses. RF-DNA fingerprints (fTD) are generated from Ns samples extracted from
the complex signal s(n) = sI(n) + jsQ(n). For consistency with [74–76, 81, 94], the
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TD RF-DNA fingerprints are generated from the centered (denoted with subscript
c) and normalized (denoted with over bar) amplitude {āc(n):n=1, . . . , Ns}, phase
{φ̄c(n):n=1, . . . , Ns}, and frequency {f̄c(n):n=1, . . . , Ns} sequences. The TD feature
sequences are given by,
a(n) =
√
s2I(n) + s
2
Q(n), (2.1)
φ(n) = tan−1
[
sQ(n)
sI(n)
]
, for sI(n) 6= 0, (2.2)
f(n) =
1
2π
[
dφ(n)
dn
]
. (2.3)
Subsequent centering and normalization of the TD feature sequences is achieved by
āc(n) =
a(n)− µa
max
n
{ac(n)}
, (2.4)
φ̄c(n) =
φ(n)− µφ
max
n
{φc(n)}
, (2.5)
f̄c(n) =
f(n)− µf
max
n
{fc(n)}
, (2.6)
where n=1, . . . , Ns, µa, µφ and µf are the amplitude, phase, and frequency means
calculated across Ns samples, and max{·} denotes the maximum of each feature
sequence’s centered magnitude.
As shown in Figure 2.4, an RF-DNA fingerprint (fTD) is generated by dividing
each of the TD sequences intoNR equal length, sequential subregions such thatNs/NR
is an integer. Features are generated by calculating statistics: standard deviation (σ),
variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and/or kurtosis (κ), over each of the NR subregions, as
well as the NR + 1 subregion which spans the entire length of a TD sequence. The
calculated statistics, for each of the selected subregions, are arranged as follows:
fRi = [σRi , σ
2
Ri
, γRi , κRi ]1×4 , (2.7)
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1 2 3 4 5 NR - 1 NR
NR + 1
fR3
σ – Std Deviation
σ2 – Variance
γ – Skewness
κ – Kurtosis
fR3 = [ σR3, σ
2
R3, γR3, κR3 ]
Arbitrary Feature Sequence
Figure 2.4: Regional fingerprint generation for NR+1 total regions using the centered
and normalized feature sequences [94].
where i = 1, 2, . . . , NR+1. A composite fingerprint is formed by concatenating the sta-
tistical features calculated to form (2.7) with one another for a selected TD sequence
as follows [94],
f δ =
[
fR1
... fR2
... fR3 · · · fRNR+1
]
1×4(NR+1)
, (2.8)
where the superscript δ denotes a specific TD sequence, i.e., {āc(n)}, {φ̄c(n)} or
{f̄c(n)}. Due to the use of multiple TD sequences in the generation of TD RF-DNA
fingerprints, the composite fingerprints from (2.8) are concatenated to compose fTD
as follows:
fTD =
[
fa
... fφ
... f f
]
1×4(NR+1)×3
. (2.9)
Therefore, fTD contains a total of N
TD
f = (# of Features) × (# of Statistics) ×
(# of Regions + 1) elements.
2.2.2 1D Spectral Domain (SD). RF-DNA fingerprinting is performed using
SD features generated as in [94] and based upon the TD methods outlined in Sec-
tion 2.2.1. SD RF-DNA fingerprints (fSD) are generated using the power-normalized
Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the complex signal sequence {s(n)} [94]. The Dis-
crete Fourier Transform (DFT) is used in calculating the desired PSD feature sequence
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{p̄(k)} as follows [70],
S(k) =
1
Ns
Ns∑
n=1
s(n)e−jΦ(Ns,n,k), (2.10)
Φ(Ns, n, k) =
(
2π
Ns
)
(n− 1)(k − 1), (2.11)
where k=0.1, . . . , Ns. To obtain the desired power-normalized PSD sequence {p̄(k)},
(2.10) is divided by the signal’s average power,
p̄(k) =
1
Ps
|S(k)|2, (2.12)
where Ps is given by,
Ps =
1
Ns
Ns∑
n=1
s(n)s(n)∗, (2.13)
and ∗ denotes complex conjugate. The PSD is normalized to diminish potential col-
lection process effects that may bias the classification results. As in [23,76,81,82,94],
the DC (k=0) and redundant
(
Ns/2 + 1, Ns/2 + 2, . . . , Ns
)
terms of {p̄(k)} are re-
moved prior to statistical fingerprint generation. As with the TD process, outlined
in Section 2.2.1, statistics are calculated over NR contiguous sub-regions within the
power-normalized PSD. Each SD RF-DNA fingerprint (fSD) is formed by grouping
the statistics as in (2.7) and subsequent concatenation to generate SD RF-DNA fin-
gerprints of the form,
fSD =
[
fR1
... fR2
... fR3 · · · fRNR+1
]
1×4(NR+1)
. (2.14)
The process in (2.14) results in fSD being comprised of a total ofN
SD
f = (# of Statistics)×
(# of Regions + 1) elements.
2.2.3 2D Joint Time-Frequency (T-F) Domain. In a majority of previous
related work, RF-DNA fingerprints were predominantly extracted from 1D TD and
SD responses [57, 58, 74, 75, 94], with Dual-Tree Complex Wavelet Transform (DT-
CWT) coefficients being AFIT’s first application of joint 2D features [56, 57]. The
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use of DT-CWT coefficients is consistent with conclusions in [9] indicating that the
use of momentary and/or time localized energy as a function of frequency can be
effective for describing signals. This motivated the use of 2D T-F localization using
the Discrete Gabor Transform (DGT) which is calculated as follows [9],
Gmk =
MN∆∑
n=1
s(n)W ∗(n−mN∆) exp
−j2πkn/KG , (2.15)
where Gmk are the Gabor coefficients, s(n)=s(n+ lMN∆) is the periodic input signal,
W (n) = W (n+ lMN∆) is the periodic analysis window, N∆ is the number of samples
shifted, m=1, 2, . . . ,M for M total shifts, and k=0, 1, . . . , KG−1 for KG≥N∆ and
mod(MN∆, KG)=0 satisfied [76]. In the case where KG=N∆, the Gabor transforma-
tion represents critical sampling. Oversampling occurs when KG>N∆ and is desirable
when processing noisy data [9, 35, 92, 97]. Therefore, oversampling was deemed ap-
propriate for this research given collected signal of interest responses are noisy; thus,
enabling a more reliable analysis with varying SNR. As in [9], the DGT was imple-
mented using a Gaussian analysis window W (n).
The GT is combined with the Wigner-Ville Distribution (WVD) to form the
Gabor-Wigner Transform (GWT) [68]. This combination takes advantage of the GTs
lack of cross-terms and faster computation as well as the higher clarity of the WVD.
While somewhat arbitrary in terms of exponential weighting, and without regard for
optimizing performance, the GWT is computed here using [68],
GWmk = G
2.6
mkV
0.6
mk, (2.16)
where Vmk is the Discrete Pseudo Wigner Distribution (DPWD) given by [18],
Vmk =
KG/2−1∑
n=−(KG/2−1)
h(n)exp−j2πkn/KG , (2.17)
h(n) = w(n)w∗(n)s(m+ n)s∗(m− n), (2.18)
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and Hamming window function w(n) is implemented as in [18]. RF-DNA fingerprints
are generated from the normalized magnitude-squared Gabor and Gabor-Wigner co-
efficients |Gmk|
2 and |GWmk|
2, respectively. The magnitude-squared coefficients are
normalized by,
|Amk|2 =
|Amk|
2 −min { |Amk|
2 }
max { |Amk|2 −min { |Amk|2 } }
. (2.19)
where Amk are the coefficients of the selected T-F transform.
As shown in Fig. 2.5, the resulting T-F surface is divided into NT×NF 2-
dimensional subregions (patches), vectorized, and statistics calculated (standard de-
viation, variance, skewness, and kurtosis). The dimensions of each NT×NF patch are
selected to ensure a minimum of NTF=15 entries are used for statistical calculation.
Similar to TD and SD RF-DNA fingerprint generation, statistics calculated over the
entire T-F surface are included and represent the NR + 1 subregion.
NT
Fingerprint Elements
# Statistics x NR
NT x NF Samples/Patch
σ – Std Deviation
σ 2 – Variance
γ – Skewness
κ – Kurtosis
NF
NR
Patches
. . . σ σ 2 γ κ
Figure 2.5: Gabor-based RF-DNA fingerprint generation using NT×NF 2D T-F
patches of centered and normalized magnitude-squared GT and GWT coefficients [76].
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2.3 Device Classification
2.3.1 MDA/ML Processing. As in [20, 74–76, 81, 82, 94], MDA/ML is used
to perform feature selection and device classification (a one-to-many “best match”
assessment). The goal of MDA is to reduce feature dimensionality while improving
class separability. MDA is an extension of Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) from a two-class case to the NC-class case, where NC is the total number of
classes/devices. MDA is a linear operation that projects the samples (i.e., the RF-
DNA fingerprints) to a (NC−1)-dimensional subspace without reducing the power
of class separability [87]. The MDA projection maximizes inter-class distances while
minimizing intra-class spread.
In MDA, the between (inter-) (Sb) and within (intra-) (Sω) class scatter matrices
are computed [87]:
Sb =
C∑
i=1
PiΣi, (2.20)
Sω =
C∑
i=1
Pi(µi − µ0)(µi − µ0)
T , (2.21)
where Σi and Pi are the covariance matrix and prior probability of class ci, re-
spectively. Individual RF-DNA fingerprints are projected into the lower (NC−1)-
dimensional subspace by:
fWi = W
T f , (2.22)
where W is the projection matrix formed from the (NC−1) eigenvectors of S
−1
ω Sb. It
is through the formation of the projection matrix W that results in the optimal ratio
between the inter-class distances and intra-class variances [87]. Figure 2.6 provides
a representative illustration of two possible MDA projection matrices. In this case,
projection matrix W1 provides “best” case class separation performance.
For each class, a total of Nτ training fingerprints are projected (denoted by
the superscript W) during the MDA training process to form the projected training
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W2
Figure 2.6: Representative MDA projection from NC=3 class inputs to two possible
NC−1=2D subspaces. [30].
matrix fW as follows:
fW =
[
fW1 , f
W
2 , · · · , f
W
Nτ
]T
Nτ×(C−1)
. (2.23)
The mean vector µ̂Wi and covariance matrix Σ̂
W
i are estimated and stored for each
class’ projected training fingerprints. A multi-variate Gaussian distribution, com-
puted using the pooled covariance matrix Σ̂WP and appropriate estimated mean vec-
tor µ̂Wi , is fitted to each class’ training samples to form the reference models. These
reference models are used to estimate the similarity measure/likelihood values of the
given fingerprint f̂ [87]:
P (f̂ |ci) =
1
(2π)(C−1)/2 det(Σ̂WP )
1/2
· exp (Fe), (2.24)
where,
Fe = −
1
2
(f̂ − µ̂i)
T (Σ̂WP )
−1(f̂ − µ̂i). (2.25)
Average percent correct device classification is calculated as the percentage of the time
the classifier correctly assigns an observed RF-DNA fingerprint to its true class over
all trials. The pooled covariance matrix Σ̂WP , used in subsequent generation of each
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class’ reference model, is calculated from the individual estimated class covariances
Σ̂Wi as follows,
Σ̂WP =
1
Nτ −NC
NC∑
i=1
Σ̂Wi , (2.26)
where NC is the total number of classes (devices).
A device’s identity is determined through the comparison of its unknown RF-
DNA fingerprint with each reference model that has been fit to each of the NC training
sets following feature selection. A classification decision is made by computing a
similarity measure between the unknown RF-DNA fingerprint and each of the NC
known reference templates and assigning it to the class that results in the best match.
As in [20], this work uses the Bayesian posterior probability, under the assumptions
of uniform costs and equal priors, as the similarity measure. This approach optimally
minimizes the classification error probability [87]. In the case of NC devices, an
unknown device’s RF-DNA fingerprint f̂ is assigned to class ci if:
P (ci|f̂) > P (cj|f̂) ∀j 6= i, (2.27)
where i∈{1, 2, . . . , NC} and P (ci|f̂) is the conditional posterior probability that f̂
belongs to class ci. Applying Bayes’ Rule, the conditional probability is computed
as [62]:
P (ci|f̂) =
P (f̂ |ci)P (ci)
P (f̂)
. (2.28)
Due to the assumption of equal prior probabilities (P (ci)=
1/NC ) for all classes, P (ci)
can be neglected when evaluating (2.28). Since the conditional probability is being
calculated for a given fingerprint f̂ , the denominator remains constant across all ci and
can be neglected as well. This reduces the decision criteria in (2.28) to maximizing
the likelihood for P (f̂ |ci) for all ci.
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2.3.2 GRLVQI Processing. GRLVQI possesses several inherent advantages
over MDA/ML-based classification and is introduced here for RF-DNA fingerprinting
given that [43, 64]:
1. There is no inherent assumption nor actual knowledge required on input data
distribution (Gaussian, Rayleigh, etc.).
2. Feature selection is performed in conjunction with classification.
3. Processing is well-suited for cases where the number of inputs may be inconsis-
tent across classes or where the inputs are comprised of noisy or inconsistent
data.
4. A relevance ranking is assigned to each feature comprising an input RF-DNA
fingerprint.
This last advantage was the most important for this research in that a direct mea-
sure relating input feature significance to the overall classification decision facilitates
Dimensionality Reduction Analysis (DRA).
For GRLVQI classifier training (model development), a predefined number of
prototype vectors (NP ), each comprised of Nf features, are assigned to represent
each of the NC classes/devices. The collection of all prototype vectors (p
n) is used
to form matrix P of dimension (NC ·NP )×Nf with the goal of defining classification
boundaries that minimize the Bayes risk. The Bayes risk is minimized by differen-
tially shifting the best In-Class pI and Out-of-Class pO prototype vectors by some
distortion dnλ computed via [43],
dnλ =
Nf∑
i=1
λi(f
m
i − p
n
i )
2, (2.29)
where n=1, 2, . . . , NP , Nf is the number of features comprising an RF-DNA finger-
print, fm is a randomly selected input fingerprint, pn∈P, and λi is the relevance (im-
portance weighting) of the ith feature satisfying ||λ||1=1 [43] with λi≥0 ∀ i∈{1, . . . , Nf}.
At the beginning of the classifier training process, λi is randomly initiated. The work
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in [64] introduces a bias parameter Bn that is adapted from [26] to minimize utilization
of poor prototype vectors. The resultant distortion is given by
dnBias = d
n
λ −B
n , (2.30)
Bn = ψ
(
1
NP
− F nold
)
, (2.31)
where ψ is selected by the user to control the amount of bias that is applied to the
distortion and F nold is the frequency at which a prototype vector is selected as the
“best” prototype vector (i.e., it has the smallest dnBias to f
m).
The best in-class prototype vector pI is the pn, with the same class label as fm,
for which dnBias is the smallest. The in-class prototype vector distortion d
I=dnBias (i.e.,
the distortion value that resulted in selection of pI). The best out-of-class prototype
vector pO is the pn, with a class label that is different than that of fm, for which
dnBias is the smallest. Thus, the out-of-class prototype vector distortion d
O=dnBias.
The prototypes are updated following selection of the best in-class and out-of-class
prototype vectors by [43],
pI(t+ 1) = pI(t) +
4αI(t)f ′|µ(fm),τd
O
(dI + dO)2
Λ(fm − pI(t)), (2.32)
pO(t+ 1) = pO(t) +
4αO(t)f ′|µ(fm),τd
I
(dI + dO)2
Λ(fm − pO(t)), (2.33)
where Λi,i = λi, α
I and αO are the learn rates for the in-class and out-of-class proto-
types, τ is a time decay term [64], and f ′|µ(fm),τ is the first derivative of the sigmoid
loss function:
f(µ(fm), τ) =
1
1 + e−τµ(fm)
, (2.34)
µ(fm) =
(
dI − dO
dI + dO
)
, (2.35)
where µ(fm) is the misclassification measure [77]. If µ(fm)<0, with µ(fm)=−1 being
perfect classification, then a correct classification occurs. Conversely, a misclassifi-
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cation occurs if µ(fm)≥0 [77]. GRLVQI implements a conditional update rule in an
effort to minimize potential divergence of the prototype vectors. Under this rule, both
of the in-class and out-of-class winning prototype vectors are updated only if the input
sample is misclassified; otherwise, only the in-class prototype vector is updated [64].
Following selection of the best in-class and out-of-class prototype vectors, the
learn rates αI and αO are adjusted and the relevances updated using [43]
∆λi = −
2α(t)λf ′|µ(fm),τ
[
dO(fm − pI)2
]
(dI + dO)2
+
2α(t)λf ′|µ(fm),τ
[
dI(fm − pO)2
]
(dI + dO)2
. (2.36)
The process is iterated for a given number of iterations (NI) or until other termination
criteria are satisfied. Following termination, the prototype vectors representing the
best model fit and associated λ are available for feature DRA. The corresponding
“best” Relevance Vector is given by
λB = [λ1, λ2, ..., λNf ] , (2.37)
where a higher λi value for a given feature indicates that that feature has greater
impact on classification performance.
Figure 2.7 illustrates GRLVQI classification, in which the distance between an
unknown RF-DNA fingerprint (f̂) and each of the prototype vectors comprising the
“best” model PB is computed by (2.29). The unknown RF-DNA fingerprint (f̂) is
subsequently assigned to class Ci by,
Ci : argmin
i,j
(
dpλ(pi,j, f̂)
)
, (2.38)
where pi,j∈PB, i=1, 2, . . . , NC , and j=1, 2, . . . , NP .
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Figure 2.7: GRLVQI classification process with an unknown fingerprint (f̂) assigned
to class Ci based upon minimum Euclidean Distance computed in (2.29) [73].
2.4 Device ID Verification
Unlike device classification, a one-to-many looks “most like” assessment whereby
an unknown device’s RF-DNA fingerprints are compared to each of the NC reference
models, device ID verification is a one-to-one looks “how much” assessment that
enables authentication of a device’s digitally claimed bit-level identity: Medium Ac-
cess Control (MAC) address, Electronic Serial Number (ESN), International Mobile
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, or the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) num-
ber. For this research, a device that falsely claims a digital identity that is different
than its own, in order to gain unauthorized network access, is designated as a “rogue”
device. In this case, the claimed identity is compared against the specific reference
model associated with the true identity [20]. The resultant verification decision is bi-
nary, with the device’s claimed identity declared authentic (rightly or wrongly) when
the verification test statistic meets or exceeds a predetermined threshold. If the test
statistic fails to meet the verification decision threshold, the device is deemed to be
an impostor/impersonator and network access is denied.
As indicated in Table 2.1 and summarized below, there are two types of verifi-
cation errors that can be made [20,24,53]:
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1. False Verification: A rogue device’s false claimed ID is deemed authentic and
the device is granted network access–measured as False Verification Rate (FVR).
2. False Reject : An authorized device’s true claimed ID is deemed rogue and the
device is not granted network access–measured as False Reject Rate (FRR).
Table 2.1: Verification Outcomes & Rates.
System Declaration (Rate)
Actual Authorized Rogue
Authorized True Verification (TVR) False Reject (FRR)
Rogue False Verification (FVR) True Reject (TRR)
By varying the decision threshold tv, system security can be increased to reduce
false verification errors or decreased to reduce false reject errors. The Receiver Op-
erating Characteristic (ROC) curve and corresponding Equal Error Rate (EER) are
used to establish device verification capability [20,24]. The ROC curve is created by
plotting True Verification Rate (TVR) versus False Verification Rate (FVR) as the
threshold value tv is varied [24, 53]. The EER is defined as the point on the ROC
curve at which the False Reject Rate (FRR = 1-TVR) equals the FVR. The EER is
commonly used as a summary statistic for comparing verification performance across
multiple systems; however, it may not represent the desired operating point in a fielded
system. In general, a lower EER value indicates better verification performance for a
given system [20,24].
28
III. Research Methodology
T
his chapter describes the signal collection, detection, post-collection processing,
classification and verification processes developed under this research, as based
on work in [74] and illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Section 3.1 outlines the signal collection
process which is performed using AFITs RF Signal Intercept and Collection System
(RFSICS). Section 3.2 describes the post-collection processing which includes digi-
tal filtering, burst detection, and the addition of scaled, like-filtered Additive White
Gaussian (AWGN) for varying the analysis SNR (SNRA). This research considered
two different classification processing techniques: Section 3.3.1 describes the Fisher-
based Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) process and
Section 3.3.2 describes the Artificial Neural Network (ANN)-based Generalized Rel-
evance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) process. Device bit-level
identification (ID) verification is described in Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2 using
reference models developed during the MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifier training pro-
cesses, respectively.
3.1 Signal Collection
The signal collection process is illustrated in Fig. 3.1 and includes the use
of an Agilent E3238S-based RFSICS having a fixed RF input filter bandwidth of
WRF=36.0 MHz that is tunable across the range of fRF∈[20.0 MHz, 6.0 GHz] [6].
The selected frequency band is down-converted to an Intermediate Frequency (IF) of
fIF=70 MHz and digitized by an Nb=12 bit Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) op-
erating at a sampling rate of fs=95 mega-samples-per-second (Msps). During analog-
to-digital conversion, the IF signal is down-converted to baseband, digitally filtered,
sub-sampled in accordance with Nyquist criteria, and subsequently stored as complex
In-Phase (I) and Quadrature (Q) data. The devices under test and the RFSICS are
co-located in an office building environment during all collections.
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Figure 3.1: Signal collection and post-collection processing [74].
3.2 Post-Collection Processing
Following collection, down-conversion, and storage, the RFSICS signal file is
converted to Matlabr format for post-collection processing, which included: 1) digi-
tal baseband filtering, 2) individual burst detection using Variance Trajectory (VT)
based upon the work in [58], 3) detected burst removal from the collection record,
and 4) noise power generation, scaling and addition to achieve the desired SNRA
and model the effects of differing channel conditions. For this work, the like-filtered
AWGN was scaled to achieve the desired SNRA∈[-3.0,27.0] dB and added directly
to the collected I−Q data. Given the relatively benign signal collection environ-
ment and correspondingly high collected SNRc which was typically in the range of
SNRc∈[30.0, 40.0] dB, the like-filtered AWGN was the dominant noise source.
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Observation: While effective for development and proof-of-concept
demonstration, the like-filtered AWGN SNRA scaling process may not
accurately reflect true SNR variation effects caused by non-Gaussian
channel noise (e.g., Rayleigh, Chi, Chi-Squared, etc.).
3.2.1 Digital Filtering. Collected signal SNR is improved by applying dig-
ital filtering prior to burst detection. This filtering induces signal “coloration” effects
that are representative of what actually occurs in realistic hardware processing. Ta-
ble 3.1 provides the parameters used for implementing the lowpass Butterworth filters
for the WiMAX and WiFi signals. For consistency with related signal modulation
work, the filter parameters were selected to achieve a baseband bandwidth WBB that
is “slightly larger” than the signal bandwidth, [8].
Table 3.1: Digital Filter Parameters.
Order (No) Bandwidth (WBB)
WiMAX 6 2.5 MHz
WiFi 4 7.7 MHz
3.2.2 Burst Detection. Amplitude-based Variance Trajectory (VT) detec-
tion is used to locate and extract desired burst responses from the overall collection
record. Elements of the VT sequence {V Ta(n)} are generated from the instantaneous
amplitude sequence {a(n)}, containing elements generated per equation (2.1), and
are generated using,
V Ta(n) = |Wa(n)−Wa(n+ 1)|, (3.1)
Wa(m) =
1
Nw
1+(m−1)NA+Nw∑
n=1+(m−1)NA
[a(n)− µw]
2,
where n=1, 2, . . . , Lw − 1, m=1, 2, . . . , Lw, Lw=b(Na −Nw)/Nsc+ 1, Na is the total
number of samples comprising a(n), Nw is the window width and NA is the number of
samples the window advances between calculations. The sample mean µw is calculated
31
over consecutive subsequence of elements {aw(n)}, taken from {a(n)} and contained
in the window [58].
3.2.3 Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) Scaling. Following VT burst detection,
the SNR of complex collected signals is on the order of SNRc∈[30.0, 40.0] dB. These
high SNRc levels allow the addition of power-scaled, like-filtered AWGN to generate
analysis signals at the desired SNRA. These signals facilitate analysis of RF-DNA
fingerprint generation, feature selection, device classification, and verification under
various degraded SNR conditions.
The average power (X) in an arbitrary complex sequence {x(k)}, k=1, 2, . . . , K,
is given by,
X =
1
K
K∑
k=1
x(k)x∗(k), (3.2)
where x∗(k) denotes the complex conjugate of x(k). Elements of the complex collected
signal sequence {sc(k)} are comprised of two components,
sc(k) = st(k) + nb(k), (3.3)
where st(k) and nb(k) are elements of the transmitted complex signal and background
noise sequences, respectively. Under the assumptions that 1) the {st(k)} and {nb(k)}
random sequences are independent, and 2) the E[{nb(k)}]=0, the total average power
Sc in K samples of {sc(k)} is given by,
Sc = St +Nb, (3.4)
where St and Nb are calculated using (3.2) and given by,
St =
1
K
K∑
k=1
st(k)s
∗
t (k), (3.5)
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Nb =
1
K
K∑
k=1
nb(k)n
∗
b(k). (3.6)
Under the two previously stated assumptions, (3.5) and (3.6) can be used to calculate
the collected signal SNR (in dB) as follows:
SNRdBc = 10× log10
(
St
Nb
)
. (3.7)
Now accounting for the addition of zero mean, independent AWGN samples
nA(k), elements of the desired analysis signal sequence {sA(k)} are generated using
(3.3) and given by,
sA(k) = st(k) + nb(k) + nA(k). (3.8)
The desired analysis SNRA of sequence {sA(k)} is achieved by scaling the av-
erage power in {nA(k)}. The elements in {nA(k)} are first generated as independent
complex AWGN samples such that E[{nA(k)}]=0 (zero mean) and E[{nA(k)
2}]=1
(unit variance). The complex noise samples are then digitally filtered using the same
parameters used to filter the signal of interest (WiMAX or WiFi per Table 3.1 in
Section 3.2.1). The like-filtered, complex noise samples are then multiplied by scale
factor Rn to achieve the desired SNRA, with power-scaling factor Rn calculated as,
Rn =
√
10
SNRdB
A
10 × St. (3.9)
Multiplying each filtered noise sample by Rn yields a total average AWGN power
that is denoted here by PG. Using this, the SNRA (in dB) for the analysis signal
given by (3.8) can be calculated using,
SNRdBA = 10× log10
(
St
Nb + PG
)
. (3.10)
Given the range of actual collected SNRc∈[30.0, 40.0] dB, and the desired range
of analysis SNRA∈[-3.0,27.0] dB, the like-filtered AWGN noise contribution domi-
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nates such that PGNb and (3.10) simplifies to,
SNRdBA ≈ 10× log10
(
St
PG
)
. (3.11)
Observation: The disparity between collected SNRc and desired SNRA
results in PGNb and effectively simulates conditions for assessing per-
formance under AWGN channel noise conditions.
3.3 Training and Classification
A total of NB=1000 emissions per device were used for generating RF-DNA
fingerprints and assessing classifier performance. The first 500 were used to generate
“training” fingerprints fβ and the remaining 500 were used to generate “testing” fin-
gerprints f̂β, where subscript β denotes the type of fingerprint (TD, SD, GT, or GWT)
used as described in Section 2.2. As in conventional classifier performance assessment,
the set of fβ represents “known” data used for model development/classifier training
and the set of f̂β represents previously “unseen” device emissions that were not used
for model development/classifier training.
To improve model development robustness and analysis reliability, Monte Carlo
training and classification were accomplished at each desired SNRA∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB
using Nz=10 independent like-filtered AWGN noise realizations per device fingerprint
and K=5-fold cross-validation. While the value of K can be data dependent, values of
K=5 andK=10 are consistent with common practice [48]. K-fold cross-validation is a
classifier model validation technique in which the training set of RF-DNA fingerprints
is partitioned intoK equally sized subsets. Classifier training is performed using K−1
subsets while the remaining subset is “held-out” for validation of the resulting model.
The K-fold process is repeated a total of K times until each of the subsets have been
“held out”. Then the average correct classification performance is computed across all
K trials. This process ensures that every RF-DNA fingerprint is “held out” exactly
once and used for training K−1 times. Selection of the “best” classification model
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was based on minimum classification error achieved across all noise realizations and
cross-validation folds for each SNRA.
3.3.1 MDA/ML Processing. The MDA/ML classifier was implemented as
described in Section 2.3.1. Classifier model development was performed usingNB=500
fβ RF-DNA fingerprints and Nz=10 independent noise realizations per fβ at each
investigated SNR. The “best” SNR-dependent model WB was selected and a mul-
tivariate Gaussian fitted to projected fWβ =fβ×WB fingerprints for each of the NC
classes using (2.24) and (2.25). Classification performance was then assessed using
NB=500 f̂β RF-DNA fingerprints and Nz=10 noise realizations per fingerprint at each
investigated SNRA; a total of 500×10=5000 independent Monte Carlo classification
decisions per SNRA.
For each test fingerprint f̂β, the likelihood is computed for each of the NC classes
using the multivariate Gaussian models developed during training. The resultant
classification decision for f̂Wβ being assigned to class c according to,
argmax
i
(
P (ci|f̂
W
β )
)
, (3.12)
where i=1, . . . , NC and P (ci|f̂
W
β ) is the conditional posterior probability that f̂
W
β be-
longs to class ci. Results for MDA/ML device classification performance are presented
in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 for RF-DNA fingerprints extracted from WiMAX and
WiFi signals, respectively.
3.3.2 GRLVQI Processing. The GRLVQI classifier was implemented per
Section 2.3.2 using the parameters in Table 3.2, where NI is the number of itera-
tions, Nf is the number of fingerprint features, and NP is the number of prototype
vectors. These specific parameter values were empirically selected based on a series
of initial studies conducted using GT RF-DNA fingerprints, extracted from near-
transient WiMAX transmissions at SNRA=3.0 dB and NC=3 devices, that resulted
in consistent classification performance within reasonable computation times.
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Table 3.2: GRLVQI Classifier Parameters.
NC NI Nf NP
WiMAX 6 1200 204 10
WiFi 4 1200 363 10
As with MDA/ML processing, GRLVQI training and testing was accomplished
using NB=500 independent fβ and f̂β RF-DNA fingerprints and Nz=10 independent
noise realizations per fingerprint at each investigated SNR. Accounting for theNz=10
independent Monte Carlo noise realizations per fingerprint, all results presented in
Chapter IV are based on 5000 independent classification decisions.
For each test fingerprint f̂β, the GRLVQI classification process declares f̂β as
belonging to class c according to,
argmin
c


√√√√
Nf∑
i=1
λi
(
f̂i − p
n,c
i
)2

 , (3.13)
where f̂i is the i
th feature element of f̂β, λi∈λ is the relevance ranking of the i
th feature,
and n=1, 2, . . . , NP with p
n,c being the nth prototype vector associated with class
model c. The resultant classification decision represents a one-to-many “best match”
based on a Euclidean distance metric that has been used successfully in previous
research [43,64]. Results for GRLVQI device classification performance are presented
in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 for RF-DNA fingerprints extracted from WiMAX and
WiFi signals, respectively.
3.4 Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
As noted in Section 2.3.2, one key advantage of the GRLVQI process over
MDA/ML processing is that it inherently provides a measure (λi∈λ for i=1, 2, . . . , Nf )
for each RF-DNA fingerprint feature, the value of which indicates the relevance of that
feature on the overall classification decision.
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Process: Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) is enabled by rank-
ordering RF-DNA fingerprint features based on their relevance to overall
classification. Once identified, a given number of less relevant features
can be removed and lower dimensional fingerprints used for classification
while maintaining a desired level of performance.
The “best” GRLVQI classification model PB and associated relevance rank-
ing λB are selected based upon the minimum classification error achieved across all
noise realizations and cross-validation folds at each investigated SNRA. Each λ
B is
subsequently stored in a NS×Nf , where NS is the number of SNRA and Nf is the
number of features comprising the RF-DNA fingerprints, matrix ΛB. Figure 3.2 shows
representative “best” GRLVQI relevance values λBi ∈Λ
B
h,i for each SNRA considered.
Figure 3.2 clearly illustrates the dependence of feature relevance on SNR [72]. There
are various strategies for selecting the “best” ranked dimensionally reduced feature
sets based upon the relevance ranking values comprising ΛBNS×NF . Using a given rel-
evance vector λB the indexes associated with the relevance values λBi ∈ λ
B can be
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Figure 3.2: Overlay of WiMAX GT relevance rankings (λBi ) for a full-dimensional
Nf=204 feature set at indicated SNR [72].
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selected by,
f(λB, θ) =
{
i ∈ N : λBi ≥ θ
}
, (3.14)
f : RNf → P(N), (3.15)
where θ is the relevance ranking selection threshold, i=1, 2, . . . , Nf , N:={1, 2, . . . , Nf},
and P is the power set of N. This is extended to operate on the matrix ΛB by,
fh(Λ
B,Θ) =
{
i ∈ N : ΛBh,i ≥ θh
}
(3.16)
where Θ = (θ1, . . . , θNS) and h=1, 2, . . . , NS. This work considers four methods for
selecting DRA subsets, based upon ΛB, for the DRA results presented in Section 4.1.3
and Section 4.2.3. Using (3.16), the four DRA methods are implemented as [72]:
1. DRA Method #1 : Uses highest ranked relevance values generated at a single
SNR to assess classification performance at all SNR and selected according to,
λ
R
j ∈ fj(Λ
B
j,? , θj), j ∈ h, (3.17)
where h=1, 2, . . . , NS, λ
R
j is a vector of the relevance values selected from the
jth row of matrix ΛB according to (3.14) .
2. DRA Method #2 : Uses highest ranked relevance values for each SNR con-
sidered to assess classification performance at that same SNR and chosen by,
λ
R
h ∈ fh(λ
B
h,? , θh), (3.18)
where h=1, 2, . . . , NS and λ
R
h is a vector comprised of the relevance values that
satisfy (3.16) at the selected SNR.
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3. DRA Method #3 : Uses highest ranked relevance values based on the average
relevance rankings calculated across all SNR considered and selected by,
λ
R
∈ f

 1
NS
Nf∑
i=1
ΛB?,i , θ

 , (3.19)
where λ
R
is the reduced average feature relevance rankings selected by (3.14).
4. DRA Method #4 : Uses the union of the highest ranked relevance values
across all SNR considered and chosen according to,
λ̆
R
∈
NS⋃
h=1
fh
(
ΛB ,Θ
)
. (3.20)
where λ̆
R
is a vector of relevance ranking values that are the union of all λBh,i∈Λ
B
that satisfy (3.16).
Figure 3.3 provides an illustration of the highest ranked relevance ranking values for
each of the four methods and selected according to (3.16).
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Figure 3.3: Overlay of highest relevance ranking values using each of the four DRA
methods and the selection operation in (3.16).
3.5 Device Bit-Level ID Verification
As outlined in Section 2.4, the one-to-one bit-level ID verification process for
devices differs from the one-to-many “best match” classification process. Specifically,
the ID verification process generates a measure of similarity that indicates “how
much” an unknown device’s current RF-DNA fingerprint matches the stored true
reference model associated with the claimed identity being presented by the unknown
device [20, 71–73]. The unknown device is either authorized or rogue and presents
bit-level credentials (e.g., MAC address, IMEI number, SIM number, etc.) to the
network for authentication. The one-to-one ID verification process is used here to
assess two scenarios:
1. Authorized Device ID Verification: Granting network access to authorized users
presenting proper bit-level credentials.
2. Rogue Device Detection: Denying network access to unauthorized rogue devices
presenting false bit-level credentials.
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The device verification process is implemented using a measure of similarity,
or verification test statistic zv, that can be based on 1) statistical measures such
Bayesian posterior probability as in [20, 29, 71], 2) geometric measures such as Eu-
clidean distance, spatial angle, etc. [72, 73], or 3) some combination thereof.
3.5.1 MDA/ML Processing. For MDA/ML device ID verification, the sim-
ilarity measure zv is generated from normalized a posterior probability. This is done
using a collection of input testing fingerprints f̂β from an “unknown” device (au-
thorized or rogue) and projection matrix WB from MDA/ML training using N
A
C
authorized devices. The projected “unknown” fingerprint responses are calculated as
f̂Wβ =f̂β×W and used to calculate N
A
C conditional probabilities representing a measure
of “how much” f̂Wβ looks like each of the “authorized” device models. The resultant
posterior probability vector for each input f̂Wβ is given by,
P =
[
P (c1|f̂
W
β ), P (c2|f̂
W
β ), . . . , P (cNAC |f̂
W
β )
]
, (3.21)
and subsequently normalized as,
P̄ =
P
∑NC
i=1 Pi
. (3.22)
For ID verification, the resultant decision is binary and the device’s claimed identity
is deemed authentic (rightly or wrongly) when the normalized a posterior probability
P̄ in (3.22) meets or exceeds a predetermined threshold:
zP̄v = P̄ (c|f̂
W
β ) ≥ tv, (3.23)
where c is the class the device has claimed to belong, and tv is the verification decision
threshold. If the posterior probability fails to meet the verification decision threshold,
the device is deemed to be an impostor/impersonator (rightly or wrongly) and denied
network access.
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The impact of varying threshold tv in (3.23) is illustrated using the represen-
tative In-Class and Out-of-Class Probability Mass Functions (PMF) in Fig. 3.4 for
an arbitrary test statistic zv. The In-Class PMF is generated using zv for the case
when an unknown device presents proper bit-level credentials matching an authorized
device and the unknown device is, in fact, the authorized device. The corresponding
in-class probability is denoted by,
p(zv|Ci , Di) , (3.24)
where Ci is the ID “claimed” by the unknown device and Di is the “actual” unknown
device’s ID. The Out-of-Class PMF is generated using zv for the case when an un-
known device falsely presents bit-level credentials of an authorized device but is in
fact a “rogue” device posing as an authorized device. The corresponding out-of-class
probability is denoted by,
p(zv|Ci , Dj), (3.25)
where j= 1, 2, . . . , NC and i 6=j.
Varying the value of tv over the interval of [0, 1] in Fig. 3.4 yields varying levels
of network security which correlate to achieving either 1) reduced rogue device access
error (i.e., reducing the out-of-class shaded area right of tv) or 2) reduced authorized
device rejection error (i.e., reducing the in-class unshaded area left of tv) [24,53]; the
inability to simultaneous achieve both of these desired effects is evident for the given
PMFs shown in Fig. 3.4.
3.5.2 GRLVQI Processing. As done for GRLVQI classification in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, composite testing fingerprints f̂β for an unknown device are used for device
ID verification. Given the pth GRLVQI prototype vector from class c (pn,c), four
similarity measures were considered for GRLVQI processing, including:
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Figure 3.4: Representative In-Class (unfilled) and Out-of-Class (filled) Probability
Mass Functions (PMFs) for arbitrary test statistic zv using a traditional verification
threshold tv in (3.23).
1. A Weighted Euclidean Distance metric calculated as,
zdv(n, c) =
√√√√
Nf∑
i=1
λi
(
f̂i − p
n,c
i
)2
, (3.26)
where f̂i∈f̂β and p
n,c
i ∈p
n,c.
2. A Normalized Euclidean Distance metric calculated as,
zd̄v(n, c) =
zdv(n, c)√
∑Nf
i=1
(
f̂i
)2
·
√∑Nf
i=1 (p
n,c
i )
2
. (3.27)
3. A Spatial Angle metric calculated as,
zθv(n, c) = cos
−1
[
Zθ(n, c)
]
, (3.28)
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where,
Zθ(n, c) =
∑Nf
i=1 f̂ip
n,c
i√
∑Nf
i=1
(
f̂i
)2
·
√∑Nf
i=1 (p
n,c
i )
2
.
4. A Distance-Angle Product metric calculated directly from (3.27) and (3.28) as,
zd̄θv (n, c) = z
d̄
v(n, c)× z
θ
v(n, c) . (3.29)
Motivation: Introduction of the Distance-Angle Product metric was
motivated by the fact that the GRLVQI classifier assigns an unknown
fingerprint to a given class based upon minimum distance. The idea is
to bias the process to select prototype vectors having both small spatial
angle and minimum distance to the unknown fingerprint.
The test statistic mean (µz) and standard deviation (σz) are calculated for a
given zv from (3.26) through (3.29) and corresponding PMFs for each of theN
A
C classes
used for device ID verification. A device’s claimed identity is correctly or incorrectly
verified according to a binary decision based upon,
−tv ≤ zv ≤ tv , (3.30)
where tv is the verification threshold given by
tv = µz + (η · σz) , (3.31)
with η controlling the span of a window centered about class mean µz. The unknown
device is declared rogue (rightly or wrongly) if zv falls outside the verification window.
This GRLVQI verification thresholding process is illustrated using the repre-
sentative In-Class (unfilled bars) and Out-of-Class (filled bars) verification PMFs in
Fig. 3.5 for an arbitrary zv, with the PMFs generated per (3.24) and (3.25), respec-
tively. As with MDA/ML-based verification, the In-Class PMF reflects a measure of
“how much” current fingerprints from authorized device c match the stored reference
model associated with the actual/true bit-level credentials for device c. The Out-of-
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Class PMF reflects a measure of “how much” current fingerprints from an unknown
device, either an authorized or previously “unseen” rogue device falsely presenting
“claimed” bit-level credentials for device c that differ from its own, matches the stored
reference model associated with the “claimed” bit-level credentials for device c.
GRLVQI device ID verification performance in Chapter IV is evaluated using
PMFs similar to those in Fig. 3.5 by varying threshold tv(η) and generating conven-
tional verification outcomes (rates) as shown in Table 2.1 [20,24,53] and reintroduced
here as Table 3.3 for completeness. If the “unknown” device is an authorized device
presenting correct bit-level credentials, True Verification Rate (TVR) provides a direct
measure of the Authorized Device Verification Rate (ADVR). If the “unknown” device
is a rogue device presenting false bit-level credentials, the TVR outcome corresponds
to falsely granting network access and the Rogue Device Detection Rate (RDDR) can
be calculated as RDDR=1−TVR.
Typical rate behavior is illustrated in Fig. 3.6 for variation in tv(η). Rate trade-
offs are quantitatively assessed using a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
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Mass Functions (PMFs) for arbitrary test statistic zv using a modified verification
threshold tv in (3.30) [72].
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Table 3.3: Verification Outcomes & Rates.
System Declaration (Rate)
Actual Authorized Rogue
Authorized True Verification (TVR) False Reject (FRR)
Rogue False Verification (FVR) True Reject (TRR)
and associated Equal Error Rate (EER) point as shown in Fig. 3.7 [34]. To character-
ize ADVR for authorized devices, ROC results in Chapter IV are generated as TVR
versus False Verification Rate (FVR). For rogue RDDR characterization, ROC results
generated as TVR versus Rogue Accept Rate (RAR).
Presentation: ROC EER points are presented in figures for reference
only and to enable qualitative visual assessment. They are not intended
to represent optimal operating points for either the proof-of-concept re-
sults presented herein or envisioned operational applications.
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IV. Device Classification and ID Verification Results
T
his chapter presents results and analysis for classification and verification of
IEEE 802.16e WiMAX and 802.11a WiFi devices using the the Multiple Dis-
criminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) and Generalized Relevance
Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI) classifiers described in Section 2.3.1
and Section 2.3.2, respectively. Section 4.1 presents results for 802.16e WiMAX de-
vices and Section 4.2 presents results for 802.11a WiFi devices. This includes classifi-
cation results using 1) a full-dimensional feature set in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.1.2
for WiMAX and Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2 for WiFi, and 2) reduced dimensional
feature sets in Section 4.1.3 (WiMAX) and Section 4.2.3 (WiFi). Section 4.1.4 and
Section 4.2.4 present verification performance results for both authorized and rogue
devices operating within a WiMAX and WiFi network, respectively.
The RF-DNA fingerprints used for demonstration were based on 1D Time Do-
main (TD), 1D Spectral Domain (SD), 2D Gabor Transform (GT), and 2D Gabor-
Wigner Transform (GWT) features as indicated. The RF-DNA features were gener-
ated from NB=1000 signal responses per device in accordance with the methodologies
detailed in Section 2.2.1 (TD), Section 2.2.2 (SD), and Section 2.2.3 (GT and GWT).
The resultant TD, SD, GT, or GWT fingerprints were comprised of Nf total RF-
DNA features with the value of Nf depending on fingerprint type and assessment
objectives. For 802.16e WiMAX results in Section 4.1 and 802.11a WiFi results in
Section 4.2, the MDA/ML classifier was implemented using procedures described in
Section 2.3.1 and Section 3.3.1 and the GRLVQI classifier was implemented using
procedures described in Section 2.3.2 and Section 3.3.2.
To facilitate direct comparison of MDA/ML and GRLVQI fingerprinting tech-
niques, the same set of RF-DNA fingerprints (F1000×Nf ), with each fingerprint gener-
ated using an independent Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) realization, was
input to both classifiers. This enabled reliable comparative assessment based on 95%
Confidence Intervals (CI=95%) using Monte Carlo simulation.
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Presentation: To enhance visual clarity and qualitative assessment, the
CI=95% intervals are intentionally omitted from all figures. However,
all figure data markers (squares, circles, triangles, etc.) have been ap-
propriately sized such that their vertical extent exceeds the CI=95%
interval. Thus, overlapping data markers which encompass data mean
values represent statistically identical results while non-overlapping data
markers represent statistically different results.
Consistent with common best practices used in pattern recognition [48], the
selected collection of NB=1000 RF-DNA fingerprints (TD, SD, GT, or GWT) was
partitioned into two subsets:
1. The first subset of F was used for classifier training and validation of the devel-
oped device reference model. The “best” reference model (WB for MDA/ML
and PB for GRLVQI) was selected by tracking classification during K-fold cross-
validation and selecting the fold model that yielded minimum classification error
(1-%C) across all K=5 cross-validation folds and Nz=10 AWGN realizations.
2. The second subset of F was used for “blind” testing the classifier to assess the
“best” model’s (WB or PB) classification performance using previously unseen
RF-DNA fingerprints, i.e., fingerprints not used for classifier training or valida-
tion in Step 1. All results presented herein are based on classifier performance
using the “blind” test set of RF-DNA fingerprints.
The procedures in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 were applied to generate RF-DNA
fingerprint sets at the desired SNR. This includes extraction of NB=1000 complex
bursts from collected signal records, down-conversion and digital baseband filtering,
and the addition of power-scaled AWGN realizations to achieve the desired Analysis
SNRA.
Presentation: While notationally introduced as SNRA for development
in Chapter III, the subscript A is henceforth dropped and SNR simply
used throughout the remainder of this chapter.
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4.1 IEEE 802.16e WiMAX Results
WiMAX Device classification and verification results were generated using se-
lected RF-DNA fingerprints extracted from emissions of six like-model 802.16e WiMAX
MS devices–denoted herein as ID #s MS63A7, MS63A9, MS66E7, MS6373, MS6387,
MSD905; thus, serial number discrimination was assessed. The procedures in Sec-
tion 3.1 and Section 3.2 were applied to generate RF-DNA fingerprint sets having a
total of NB=1000 complex bursts per device. In accordance with Section 3.2, the col-
lected signals were digitally filtered, individual bursts detected and removed from the
overall collection record, and the SNR scaled to achieve the desired Analysis SNRA.
Assessment results in this chapter are for SNR∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB in 3.0 dB incre-
ments, with the SNR scaling process was repeated Nz=10 times to ensure sufficient
statistical significance for Monte Carlo analysis. For WiMAX assessment, the full-
dimensional TD, SD, GT, or GWT fingerprints were comprised ofNf=[72, 24, 204, 204].
Results are first presented for full-dimensional RF-DNA fingerprinting in Section 4.1.1
and Section 4.1.2 followed by reduced dimensional fingerprinting results in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1 Full-Dimensional WiMAX Classification: MDA/ML. Figure 4.1
shows cross-device average and individual device MDA/ML Correct Classification Per-
centage (%C) using TD, SD, GT, and GWTRF-DNA fingerprints for SNR∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB.
Figure 4.1(a) shows MDA/ML performance using TD RF-DNA fingerprints (Nf=72
features) and reflects 1) cross-device average classification performance of %C≥90%
for SNR≥15.0 dB, and 2) individual device %C≥90% for 5 of 6 WiMAX MS devices.
As indicated in Fig. 4.1(b), performance with SD RF-DNA features is considerably
poorer with %C≥90% achieved for only one device (MSD905) at SNR≥12.0 dB. Fig-
ure 4.1(c) and Fig. 4.1(d) present performance using joint T-F domain fingerprints
generated using GT and GWT features, respectively. From a cross-device average
perspective, GT features are superior with %C≥90% achieved for SNR≥7.5 dB. This
represents a “gain” of Gp≈4.5 dB relative to GWT RF-DNA fingerprinting which
requires SNR≥12.0 dB to achieve average performance of %C≥90%.
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Definition: Gain (Gp): Reduction in required SNR, in dB, for two
methods to achieve a given %C classification performance.
The superiority of GT features is also evident when analyzing individual device
performances. GT feature results in Fig. 4.1(c) show that all devices achieve the
%C≥90% benchmark for SNR≥12.0 dB. This is in sharp contrast to GWT results
in Fig. 4.1(d) which show that two devices (MS63A7 and MS66E7) never reach the
%C≥90% benchmark for all SNR considered. Based upon results in Fig. 4.1, it is con-
cluded that GT RF-DNA features are the best alternative for achieving serial number
classification of 802.16e WiMAX MS devices when using MDA/ML processing.
General: The underlying factors for GT feature superiority, relative to
what is achieved with GWT features, was not of primary interest. Recall
that GWT features were introduced as a means to assess linear versus
non-linear feature performance in a multipath environment.
Note: The superiority of GT fingerprinting in Fig. 4.1 is not attributable
to the larger number of full-dimensional features being used. This is
subsequently demonstrated using DRA in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.2 Full-Dimensional WiMAX Classification: GRLVQI. Full-dimensional
GRLVQI classification performance was assessed using the same six WiMAX MS de-
vices used for classification assessment in Section 4.1.1. Individual device as well as
average GRLVQI %C performance using TD, SD, GT, and GWT RF-DNA finger-
prints at SNR∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB is shown in Fig. 4.2. For TD RF-DNA fingerprints,
two of six individual WiMAX MS devices (MS634A7 and MSD905) achieve 90% or
better correct classification at SNR≥9.0 dB. Classification of MS6387 is individually
classified correctly at 90% for 15≤SNR≥21.0 dB; however, individual classification
of the remaining WiMAX devices fails to achieve %C=90% using TD RF-DNA fin-
gerprints, Fig. 4.2(a). Average GRLVQI classification using TD fingerprints is 90%
or better for SNR≥24.0 dB. Figure 4.2(b) illustrates individual device and average
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(b) Spectral Domain (SD): Nf=24.
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(c) Gabor Transform (GT): Nf=204
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(d) Gabor-Wigner Transform (GWT): Nf=204
Figure 4.1: Full-Dimensional MDA/ML classification performance using TD, SD, GT
and GWT RF-DNA features from six 802.16e WiMAX devices [76].
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classification performance using SD RF-DNA fingerprints. The GRLVQI classifier
correctly identifies device MSD905 with %C=90% certainty for SNR≥15.0 dB. All
other individual devices as well as average classification performance fails to achieve
the %C=90% benchmark. Figure 4.2(c) provides an illustration of individual as well
as average device GRLVQI classification performance using GT-based RF-DNA fin-
gerprints. Individual device classification performance is 90% or better for all WiMAX
MS devices, except MS6373, for SNR≥15.0 dB. MSD905 is corretly classified at 90%
or better for all investigated SNRs. Average device classification performance is 90%
or better for SNR≥12.0 dB.
GRLVQI individual and average device classification performance, using GWT
RF-DNA fingerprints, is shown in Fig. 4.2(d). As with GT fingerprint classifica-
tion performance, MSD905 is correctly identified at a rate of 90% or better for
SNR∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB. In comparison to GT-based classification results, individ-
ual classification of MS66E7 using GWT RF-DNA fingerprints never achieves the
%C=90% benchmark; representing a performance degradation. The average device
classification performance suffers a 3.0 dB loss, dropping from SNR=12.0 to 15.0 dB,
when switching from GT to GWT RF-DNA fingerprints. Results in Fig. 4.2 illustrate
that GRLVQI classification using GT RF-DNA fingerprints provides the best means
for achieving serial number classification of 802.16e WiMAX MS devices.
Note: The superiority of GT fingerprinting in Fig. 4.2 is not attributable
to the larger number of full-dimensional features being used. This is
subsequently demonstrated using DRA in Section 4.1.3.
Figure 4.3 provides a direct comparison between average device classification
performance of the MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers. Clearly MDA/ML results in
the best average classification performance; however, GRLVQI classifier performance
is within 10% of the MDA/ML results. Although GRLVQI does not achieve the
same degree of individual and average device classification performance, as that of
MDA/ML, it addresses one key shortfall of the MDA/ML classifier in that GRLVQI
provides a direct measure of how much each individual feature, that comprise an
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(c) Gabor Transform (GT): Nf=204 [72]
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
C
o
rr
ec
t
SNR (dB)
MS63A7
MS63A9
MS66E7
MS6373
MS6387
MSD905
Mean
(d) Gabor-Wigner Transform (GWT): Nf=204)
Figure 4.2: Full-Dimensional GRLVQI classification performance using TD, SD, GT
and GWT RF-DNA features from six 802.16e WiMAX devices.
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Figure 4.3: Cross-device average MDA/ML and GRLVQI classification performance
for 802.16e WiMAX devices using Gabor Transform (GT) RF-DNA features.
RF-DNA fingerprint, contributes to a classification decision. This measure of feature
contribution is defined as its relevance ranking, as defined in Section 2.3.2, and enables
Dimensionality Reduction Analysis (DRA).
4.1.3 DRA Impact on WiMAX Classification. This section provides Di-
mensionality Reduction Analysis (DRA) results using the four strategies for selec-
tion of the “best” ranked dimensionally reduced feature sets as described in Sec-
tion 3.4. Prior to generation of MDA/ML and GRLVQI classification performance
for SNR∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB, an initial assessment was performed using relevance values
selected using (3.17) for SNR=12.0 dB (j=6) to assess DRA impact on classification
performance. Initial DRA impact on device classification was assessed using three
reduced subsets selected using the relevance values λR6 ∈f6(Λ
B
6,?, θ6) and comprised of
the:
1. Highest ranked 10% features (DRA1=90%).
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Figure 4.4: GRLVQI λi relevance values for highest ranked 10% (squares) and second-
highest ranked 10% (triangles) at SNR=12.0 dB [72].
2. Second highest ranked 10% features (DRA2=90%).
3. Highest ranked 20% features–union of DRA1 and DRA2 (DRA3=80%).
Corresponding λi values for the two 10% subsets extracted from Fig. 3.2 are
shown in Fig. 4.4. It is clear that the λi values for the second-highest ranked 10%
are much lower than the highest ranked 10%; thus indicating that these features
contribute very little to the classification decision.
Based upon the full-dimensional classification results presented in Section 4.1.1
and Section 4.1.2, GT-based RF-DNA fingerprints extracted from WiMAX near-
transient responses are used to assess the effectiveness of the GRLVQI classifier’s
assigned feature rankings ΛB. The effectiveness of the GRLVQI feature ranking pro-
cess is illustrated in Fig. 4.5(a) which shows GRLVQI device classification perfor-
mance for the reduced-feature subsets described above, as well as performance using
all Nf=204 features. Approximate computation times are shown along the horizontal
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axis in parenthesis for each case. Based upon these results it is clearly evident that
the GRLVQI process is very effective in ranking relevant classification features. This
conclusion is reinforced by several observations:
1. Performance with the 20 highest ranked (top 10%) features is statistically equiv-
alent to full-dimensional performance and yields a significant 10× reduction in
required computation time.
2. Performance with the second-highest 20 ranked features is considerably poorer
than that of full-dimensional performance, with device classification degrading
by 5% to 30%.
3. Performance using the highest 40 ranked features is statistically equivalent to
performance using the highest 20 ranked features. This suggests that the addi-
tional 20 features are either irrelevant or contain redundant information and a
2× processing penalty is incurred.
As a final independent assessment of GRLVQI DRA effectiveness, the identical
reduced feature sets were used with the MDA/ML classifier described in Section 2.3.1.
Reduced dimension MDA/ML classification results are presented in Fig. 4.5(b) along
with full-dimensional results for comparison. With regard to classification perfor-
mance, MDA/ML results and conclusions are consistent with GRLVQI results in
Fig. 4.5(a). However, MDA/ML results using the highest ranked 10% features only
required approximately 1/300th of the GRLVQI computation time. The added “in-
sight” that GRLVQI provides is clearly beneficial, but it does come at a cost.
The patches providing greatest discriminating information are highlighted in
Fig. 4.6. This figure shows the T-F responses for arbitrary bursts from each of the six
authorized devices (MS63A7, MS63A9, MS66E7, MS6373, MS6387, MSD905). The
red rectangles identify patch locations containing the highest ranked 10% features as
shown in Fig. 4.4 and used to generate results in Fig. 4.5. As indicated, discrimination
is not solely obtained from information contained in T-F patches containing higher
level signal responses.
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Figure 4.5: WiMAX Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA): Full-dimensional (All)
vs. three DRA feature sets comprised of highest ranked 10% (Top 20), highest ranked
20% (Top 40), and second-highest ranked 10% (2nd 20) features at SNR=12.0 dB [72].
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Figure 4.6: Gabor T-F responses for NC=6 WiMAX devices: Rectangular patches
identify regions containing the highest ranked 10% (Top 20) features in Fig. 4.4. One
representative response shown per device [72].
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1. DRA Method #1: Individual WiMAX MS device classification performance
using the DRA Method #1 feature subset-top 20 ranked features selected
using relevance ranking at a single SNR, (3.17), is shown in Fig. 4.7. For
SNR≥15.0 dB, individual device classification is 80% or better using the GR-
LQVI and MDA/ML classifiers. Average device classification is 90% or better
for both classifiers at SNR≥12.0 dB.
2. DRA Method #2: Figure 4.8 shows individual WiMAX MS device classifica-
tion performance using the DRA Method #2 feature selection technique-top 20
ranked features selected using the relevance rankings at each SNR, (3.18). Indi-
vidual device classification is 80% or better using the GRLQVI and MDA/ML
classifiers for SNR≥15.0 dB. These results are comparable to those of DRA
Method #1.
3. DRA Method #3: Figure 4.9 shows individual WiMAX MS device classification
performance using the DRA Method #3 feature subset-top 20 ranked features
are chosen from the average relevance ranking computed across all SNR, (3.19).
Individual device classification is 80% or better for the GRLVQI classifier at
SNR≥15.0 dB. The MDA/ML classifier achieves an individual device classifi-
cation performance for five of the six MS of 80% or better for SNR≥9.0 dB.
Unlike the previous two DRA methods, there are two notable observations from
the DRA Method #3:
(a) GRLQVI classifier performance is improved when compared with that of
DRA Method #1 and Method #2.
(b) MDA/ML performance is much better for five of the six MS devices than
that of DRA Method #2.
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Figure 4.7: DRA Method #1 : Device classification performance with the top 20
ranked features selected by (3.17).
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Figure 4.8: DRA Method #2 : Device classification performance with top 20 ranked
features selected using (3.18).
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Observation: For operational network security, DRA Method #3 pro-
vides a means for determining a single, SNR independent set of features
that can be used to discriminate devices under varying channel condi-
tions. This simplifies system implementation and mitigates the need to
estimate SNR in real-time applications.
4. DRA Method #4: Individual WiMAX MS device classification performance
using the DRA Method #4 feature subset is shown in Fig. 4.10 where the top 20
ranked features are selected the union of the relevance rankings across all SNR,
(3.20). GRLVQI classification performance is 80% or better for all individual
devices for SNR≥15.0 dB. When compared with DRA Method #3, GRLVQI
performance is slightly degraded for MS6373 and MS66E7 for SNR≥21.0 dB.
There is also a degradation of MDA/ML performance with respect to MS66E7
at 12≥SNR≤21.0 dB. However, DRA Method #4 provides the same benefit
as DRA Method #3 in that a single set of SNR independent features can be
selected to provide device classification.
Figure 4.11 provides a direct comparison of average cross-device classification
performance for a full-dimensional feature set and results for four DRA sets from
Fig. 4.7 – Fig. 4.10. Figure 4.11(a) shows that GRLVQI processing with all four DRA
selection methods yields average performance that is comparable to full-dimensional
results. For MDA/ML processing, Fig. 4.11(b) shows that none of the DRA se-
lection methods yield results matching full-dimensional performance, with 1) DRA
Method #1 being superior to all other methods for SNR≥15.0 dB, and 2) all four
DRA methods being within %C≈±5.0% of one another for SNR<15.0 dB. Based
upon these results and the observation that DRA Method #3 provides a means for
determining a single, SNR independent set of RF-DNA features, all subsequent DRA
results are generated using reduced feature sets selected by DRA Method #3.
4.1.4 WiMAX Device ID Verification. For device ID verification, a total
of twelve WiMAX MS devices are used. The six previously used for device classi-
fication are designated as “authorized” network devices and the remaining six MS
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Figure 4.9: DRA Method #3 : Device classification performance with top 20 ranked
feature selected using (3.19).
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Figure 4.10: DRA Method #4 : Device classification performance with top 20 ranked
feature selected using (3.20).
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Figure 4.11: Overlay of average cross-device Classification performance for a full-
dimensional feature set and results for four DRA sets from Fig. 4.7 – Fig. 4.10.
66
(ID #s MS637D, MS9993, MSC2FF, MSDAB9, MSDAC5, MSDDBF) are designated
as “rogue” network devices. These “rogue” devices are used to assess device verifica-
tion performance for the case where a previously unseen device (not present during
classifier training) falsely presents a bit-level identity matching an authorized device
and attempts to gain network access by posing as an authorized device.
4.1.4.1 MDA/ML Processing. As in [20, 29, 71], WiMAX device ID
verification performance is assessed using full-dimensional GT RF-DNA fingerprints
and the Normalized Posterior Probability verification test statistic zv generated per
(3.22) in Section 3.5.1. Individual verification performance for the six authorized
WiMAXMS devices (ID #s MS63A7, MS63A9, MS66E7, MS6373, MS6387, MSD905)
at SNR=6.0 dB is shown in Fig. 4.12. As described in Section 2.4 and Section 3.5.1,
the ROC curves are formulated by testing the verification performance using each
authorized device’s claimed bit-level identity (MAC address) against their known true
identity. This true identity is the “best” case model (minimum average classification
error) resulting from the MDA/ML classifier training process. The individual ROC
curves provide an illustration of the trade-off that exists between network security
and receptiveness as the threshold tv is varied for a selected device [20].
Figure 4.12 shows that for an arbitrary EER≤10% benchmark is achieved for
all six of the authorized devices. Devices MSD905 and MS66E7 achieved the highest
and poorest EERs of 0% and 0.05% at SNR=6.0 dB, respectively. The ROC curves
for the two WiMAX MS devices that resulted in the best case (Fig. 4.13(a)) and worst
case (Fig. 4.13(b)) device classification performance for SNR=[0.0, 3.0, 6.0] dB are
shown in Fig. 4.13. At SNR=0.0 dB, these figures show that the poorest EER occurs
for MS66E7 with a value of approximately 0.23%. The verification results for the
remaining four WiMAX MS devices (ID #s MS63A7, MS63A9, MS6373, MS6387)
are shown in Fig. A.1 of Appendix A.1.
4.1.4.2 GRLVQI Processing. Based upon the results presented in
Section 4.1.3, GRLVQI-based device ID verification is performed using dimensionally
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Figure 4.12: MDA/ML verification ROC curves for WiMAX MS devices using the
Normalized Posterior Probability test statistic and Gabor Transform (GT) RF-DNA
features at SNR=6.0 dB [71].
reduced GT RF-DNA Fingerprints in which the top 20 features are selected by DRA
Method #4: (3.20). As with MDA/ML-based device ID verification results, presented
in Section 4.1.4.1, ROC curves, created from the rates shown in Table 2.1 and an
arbitrary benchmark of EER≤10%, are used to quantify verification performance. In
accordance with Section 3.5.2, the verification test statistic zv is generated using one
of four similarity measures, including: Euclidean Distance (dE) per (2.29), Normalized
Euclidean Distance (d̄E) per (3.27), Spatial Angle (θs) per (3.28), and Spatial Angle-
Times-Normalized Euclidean Distance (θs×d̄E) per (3.29).
Device ID verification is performed using the set of NAC=6 Authorized WiMAX
devices used for classification results presented at the beginning of Section 4.1. Fig-
ure 4.14 shows individual Authorized device verification performance using each of
the four similarity measures. Results in Fig. 4.14(a) and Fig. 4.14(b) represent in-
dividual Authorized device verification performance using the distance-only dE and
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(a) Best Case: Device ID #MSD905.
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(b) Worst Case: Device ID #MS66E7.
Figure 4.13: MDA/ML verification ROC curves for best case and worst case WiMAX
MS devices using the Normalized Posterior Probability test statistic and Gabor Trans-
form (GT) RF-DNA features at SNR=[0.0, 3.0, 6.0] dB [71].
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d̄E test statistics, respectively. These two test statistics yielded poorest Authorized
device verification performance and failed to achieve an arbitrary Authorized Device
Verification Rate (ADVR) of ADVR≥90% (EER≤10%) for 2 of 6 authorized devices
where ADVR equals the True Verification Rate (TVR) shown in the ROC curves.
For both cases, poorest performance is indicated for authorized device ID #MS66E7
which would be denied network access nearly 20% of the time. In an effort to obtain
the arbitrary EER≤10% benchmark for all authorized devices, verification is per-
formed using test statistics generated from the Spatial Angle and the product of the
Spatial Angle and Normalized Euclidean Distance similarity measure.
Results in Fig. 4.14(c) and Fig. 4.14(d) represent authorized device verification
ROC curves using the spatial angle and product of the spatial angle and normalized
Euclidean distance based test statistics. Both test statistics achieve the arbitrary
EER≤10% benchmark for all six of the authorized devices. The product of the spa-
tial angle and normalized Euclidean distance offers some improvement over spatial
angle only in that 5 of the six devices achieves an EER≤0.10%.
The ability to verify authorized network devices only addresses one aspect of the
network security problem. The other important aspect is the rogue device rejection
capability. In this case, previously unseen “rogue” devices endeavor to gain unau-
thorized network access by posing as an authorized device. This is done by falsely
presenting bit-level credentials matching an authorized device identity. This work
has designated devices that perform such nefarious acts as Rogue devices. There-
fore, an additional set of NRC=6 Rogue WiMAX devices (ID#s MS637D, MS9993,
MSC2FF, MSDAB9, MSDAC5, MSDDBF) are used to test the effectiveness of the
developed device ID verification process. Each of the NRC=6 Rogue WiMAX devices
falsely presents the bit-level ID for each of the NAC=6 Authorized WiMAX devices;
thus, representing a total of 36 attempts at gaining unauthorized network access. Of
the six rogue devices, MS637D provided the greatest challenge to successful device
verification. Figure 4.15 shows the verification results for the case of MS637D posing
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(a) Euclidean Distance (dE).
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(b) Normalized Euclidean Distance (d̄E).
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(c) Spatial Angle (θs).
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(d) Angle-Times-Distance (θs×d̄E) [72].
Figure 4.14: GRLVQI verification ROC curves for NAC=6 Authorized WiMAX MS de-
vices using Gabor Transform (GT) RF-DNA features at SNR=18.0 dB and indicated
similarity measures per Section 3.5.2.
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as each of the authorized devices. Results in Fig. 4.15(a) and Fig. 4.15(b) show that
MS637D would gain network access approximately 25% of the time when claiming
the bit-level identity of authorized device MS6387 and the Euclidean or Normalized
Euclidean Distances are used as the test statistic zv. Figure 4.15(c) illustrates that the
Spatial Angle test statistic results in MS637D being verified as MS6373, MS6387, and
MS66E7 at rates of approximately 25%, 30%, and 42%, respectively. This represents
the poorest case of rogue device verification. Rogue device verification, for MS637D,
based upon the product of spatial angle and normalized Euclidean distance is shown
in Fig. 4.15(d). For this case, MS637D is verified as authorized device MS6387 ap-
proximately 30% of the time. When considering both authorized and rogue device
verification performance, the product of the spatial angle and normalized Euclidean
distance test statistic provides the best means of permitting authorized device ac-
cess while simultaneously denying rogue devices. Using the angle-distance product,
Fig. 4.16 shows resultant ROC and EER results representing a total of 36 rogue de-
vice detection scenarios where each of the NRC=6 Rogue devices present false bit-level
credentials for each of the NAC=6 authorized devices. As indicated by the dashed line,
Rogue device ID #MS637D provides the greatest security risk when presenting false
bit-level credentials matching authorized device ID #MS6387 [72]. The remaining
device verification results for all the test statistics and the remaining NRC=5 Rogue
devices are presented in Appendix A.1.
Observation: The benefits of GT-based RF-fingerprints and DRA fea-
ture selection method #3 are leveraged for the 802.11a WiFi results.
72
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
EER
T
ru
e
V
er
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
R
a
te
(T
V
R
)
Rogue Accept Rate (RAR)
MS63A7
MS63A9
MS66E7
MS6373
MS6387
MSD905
(a) Euclidean Distance (dE).
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(b) Normalized Euclidean Distance (d̄E).
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(c) Spatial Angle (θs).
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(d) Spatial Angle-Times-Normalized Eu-
clidean Distance (θs×d̄E) [72].
Figure 4.15: GRLVQI verification ROC curves for NRC=6 Rogue WiMAX MS devices
using Gabor Transform (GT) RF-DNA features at SNR=18.0 dB and indicated sim-
ilarity measures per Section 3.5.2.
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Figure 4.16: GRLVQI verification ROC curves for NRC=6 Rogue devices present-
ing false bit-level credentials for each of the NAC=6 authorized devices (36 total
rogue scenarios represented) using Gabor Transform (GT) RF-DNA features at
SNR=18.0 dB [72].
4.2 IEEE 802.11a WiFi Results
As described in Section 3.3 (classification) and Section 3.5 (verification), results
were generated using RF-DNA fingerprints extracted from 802.11a WiFi preamble
emissions–the same emissions used previously for Dual Tree Complex Wavelet Trans-
form (DT-CWT) results in [56, 57]. Following the procedure outlined in Section 3.1,
collections for each of the NC=4 WiFi devices to ensure a total of NB=1000 complex
bursts per device. The collected signals were subsequently digitally filtered, individual
bursts detected for removal from the overall collection record, and the SNR scaled
per Section 3.2.
Assessment results in this section are for SNR∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB in 3.0 dB in-
crements, with the SNR scaling process was repeated Nz=10 times to ensure suffi-
cient statistical significance for Monte Carlo analysis. For WiFi assessment, the full-
dimensional TD, SD, GT, or GWT fingerprints were comprised ofNf=[117, 33, 363, 363].
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Results are first presented for full-dimensional RF-DNA fingerprinting in Section 4.2.1
and Section 4.2.2 followed by reduced dimensional fingerprinting results in Section 4.2.3.
As with WiMAX processing in Section 4.1, CI=95% confidence interval analysis was
facilitated through the use of Nz=10 AWGN realizations per SNR with the intervals
once again omitted in all data plots to enhance visual clarity.
WiFi device classification results are based on four like-model devices from the
same manufacturer having different serial numbers–denoted herein as ID #s N4U9,
N4UD, N4UW, N4PX; thus, representing serial number discrimination. Each of the
RF-DNA fingerprint sets (TD, SD, GT, and GWT) was divided into two subsets.
Training of the classifier and validation of the developed model is performed using
the first subset. While the classifier is trained, the “best” reference model is selected
and stored by tracking the model that results in the lowest classification error across
all K=5 cross-validation folds and Nz=10 noise realizations. The second subset is
used to perform a “blind” test of classification performance capability using the se-
lected “best” reference model. Best practice pattern recognition processes suggest the
use of such data partitioning techniques [48]. The “blind” test classification results
are presented here using both full dimensional RF-DNA fingerprints in Section 4.2.1
and Section 4.2.2 while reduced dimensional RF-DNA fingerprints are presented in
Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Full-Dimensional WiFi Classification: MDA/ML. MDA/ML clas-
sification results using the full-dimensional “blind” RF-DNA fingerprint subset are
shown in this section. Individual device and average MDA/ML percent correct clas-
sification performance for all four RF-DNA fingerprint creation techniques, across
SNR∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB, are shown in Fig. 4.17. TD RF-DNA fingerprint results are
shown in Fig. 4.17(a) and illustrates that average percent correct classification perfor-
mance is 90% for SNR=27.0 dB. Individual device classification performance, using
TD fingerprints, meets or exceeds 90% for 3 of the 4 investigated devices at the highest
SNR. Individual MDA/ML classification performance, using SD RF-DNA, is 90%
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or better for devices N4PX and N4UD at SNR≥12.0 dB, Fig. 4.17(b). Average SD
RF-DNA classification performance is 90% or better at SNR≥18.0 dB. Joint time-
frequency domain individual device and average classification performance is shown
for GT and GWT RF-DNA fingerprints in Fig. 4.17(c) and Fig. 4.17(d), respectively.
For GWT RF-DNA, only two of the four devices (ID #s N4UD, N4PX) achieve an in-
dividual classification percent correct performance of 90% or better at SNR≥12.0 dB,
and average classification performance is 90% or better for SNR≥21.0 dB. Using GT
RF-DNA fingerprints, the MDA/ML classifier obtains an individual device and aver-
age classification performance of 90% or better at SNR≥12.0 dB and SNR=9.0 dB,
respectively. These results show that GT-based RF-DNA fingerprinting provides the
best means of achieving serial number discrimination of 802.11a WiFi devices.
Note: The superiority of GT fingerprinting in Fig. 4.17 is not at-
tributable to the larger number of full-dimensional features being used.
This is subsequently demonstrated using DRA in Section 4.2.3.
Figure 4.18 provides a comparison of the average MDA/ML classification per-
formaces for each the four RF-DNA fingerprinting techniques described in Section 2.2
as well as the DT-CWT results from [56,57]. The DT-CWT results are for the same
four 802.11a WiFi devices and are the average computed across all combinations of
three devices. Each of the DT-CWT RF-DNA fingerprints were comprised of Nf=135
features. The GT-based classification results are superior to the DT-CWT results,
for SNR≥4.0 dB. Relative to other features, GT RF-DNA fingerprinting yields a
gain in performance of Gp≈16.0 dB (TD), Gp≈9.0 dB (SD), Gp≈9.0 dB (GWT),
and Gp≈7.0 dB (DT-CWT) at %C=90% classification accuracy. As in [94], SD RF-
DNA fingerprinting performance is consistent with DT-CWT performance across all
investigated SNR.
4.2.2 Full-Dimensional WiFi Classification: GRLVQI. Using the same RF-
DNA fingerprints for four WiFi devices classified in Section 4.2.1, full-dimensional GR-
LVQI classification results are presented in this section. Figure 4.19 illustrates indi-
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(a) Time Domain (TD): Nf=117.
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(b) Spectral Domain (SD): Nf=33.
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(c) Gabor Transform (GT): Nf=363.
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(d) Gabor-Wigner Transform (GWT): Nf=363.
Figure 4.17: Full-Dimensional MDA/ML classification performance using TD, SD,
GT and GWT RF-DNA features from NC=4 802.11a WiFi devices.
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Figure 4.18: Average MDA/ML WiFi classification performance from Fig. 4.17 over-
layed with previously published DT-CWT results from [57].
vidual device and average GRLVQI percent correct classification performance for TD,
SD, GT, and GWTRF-DNA fingerprint generation techniques at SNR∈[−3.0, 27.0] dB.
Figure 4.19(a) shows individual device and average GRLVQI percent correct classifica-
tion performance using TD RF-DNA fingerprints. Average TD RF-DNA classification
fails to achieve the 90% correct performance benchmark for all investigated SNR, and
only device N4PX is classified correctly at a rate of 90% or better for SNR≥18.0 dB.
GRLVQI individual device and average classification results, using SD fingerprints,
are shown in Fig. 4.19(b). Two of the tested 802.11a WiFi devices (ID #s N4UD and
N4PX) are correctly classified at a rate of 90% or better for SNR≥12.0 dB. Average
classification performance using SD RF-DNA is 90% or better for SNR≥18.0 dB and
represents a significant, approximate 18.0 dB improvement over TD results.
GT-based RF-DNA fingerprint GRLVQI classification performance is illus-
trated in Fig. 4.19(c). All four devices are correctly classified at 90% or better perfor-
mance for SNR≥18.0 dB. Average percent correct classification performance meets or
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(c) Gabor Transform (GT): Nf=363 [73].
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(d) Gabor-Wigner Transform (GWT): Nf=363.
Figure 4.19: Full-Dimensional GRLVQI classification performance using TD, SD, GT
and GWT RF-DNA features from NC=4 802.11a WiFi devices.
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exceeds the arbitrary 90% benchmark for SNR≥15.0 dB. GRLVQI individual device
and average percent correct classification performance is illustrated in Fig. 4.19(d) for
the GWT RF-DNA generation technique. As with GT-based results, GWT-based
RF-DNA classification performance of WiFi devices: N4UD and N4PX, is 90% or
better for SNR≥12.0 dB. However, when comparing average GWT RF-DNA classi-
fication performance to that of the GT-based results, performance is deteriorated by
approximately 9.0 dB. As with MDA/ML results in Section 4.2.1, GRLVQI classifi-
cation using GT RF-DNA fingerprints provides the best means for achieving serial
number discrimination of 802.11a WiFi devices. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.20 re-
sults which reflect an approximate gain of Gp=15.0 dB (TD), Gp=5.0 dB (SD), and
Gp=10.0 dB (GWT-based) for other methods.
Note: The superiority of GT fingerprinting in Fig. 4.19 is not at-
tributable to the larger number of full-dimensional features being used.
This is subsequently demonstrated using DRA in Section 4.2.3.
A direct comparison of average classification performance, using GT RF-DNA,
of the MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers is shown in Fig. 4.21. The MDA/ML and
GRLVQI average performances are statistically equivalent for SNR∈[−3.0, 3.0] dB
and [21.0, 27.0] dB. MDA/ML average results are superior to GRLVQI-based results
for SNR∈[3.0, 21.0] dB; however, at the point of greatest difference (SNR≈9.0 dB)
GRLVQI is within 12% of MDA/ML classifier performance. As previously stated,
the advantage, over MDA/ML, of the GRLVQI classifier is that it facilitates Di-
mensionality Reduction Analysis by providing a measure of feature contribution to a
classification decision, via the relevance ranking λi.
4.2.3 DRA Impact on WiFi Classification. Based upon WiFi classifica-
tion results in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2 along with the WiMAX results in
Section 4.1.3, the impact of dimensionally reduced WiFi GT RF-DNA fingerprints
on MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifier performance was next assessed. Based on the
initial WiMAX DRA assessment in Section 4.1.3, it was determined that a feature
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set containing only the top 10% of ranked features provided statistically equivalent
classification performance to results achieved using a full-dimensional feature set. Fur-
thermore, selection of the DRA feature subset was performed using DRA Method #3
for the following reasons:
1. GRLQVI classifier performance was best when using DRA Method #3 when
compared to performance using either DRA Method #1 and Method #2.
2. MDA/ML classifier performance was much better for five of six MS devices
when using DRA Method #3 relative to what was achieved using Method #2.
3. DRA Method #3 provides a means for determining a single, SNR independent
subset of relevant features that can be used to reliably discriminate devices at
multiple SNR; this mitigates the need to estimate SNR in real-time applications
and enhances experimental-to-operational transition opportunity.
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Figure 4.20: Average GRLVQI classification performances from Fig. 4.19 using TD,
SD, GT and GWT RF-DNA features from NC=4 802.11a WiFi devices.
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Figure 4.21: WiFi classifier performance comparison showing Fig. 4.18 MDA/ML and
Fig. 4.20 GRLVQI cross-device average results using Gabor Transform (GT) RF-DNA
features from NC=4 802.11a WiFi devices.
Figure 4.22 shows T-F responses for arbitrary bursts that were randomly se-
lected from each of the NC=4 802.11a WiFi devices (ID #s N4U9, N4UD, N4UW,
N4PX). The regions containing the highest ranked 10% (Top 36) features are high-
lighted by red rectangles. All reduced dimensional results in this section were gener-
ated using the highest ranked Nf=36 WiFi features.
Figure 4.23 shows WiFi device classification performance using the top Nf=36
ranked GT features that were selected using DRA Method #3 per (3.19). As shown,
MDA/ML performance is generally better than GRLVQI using the dimensionally
reduced GT RF-DNA fingerprints and includes: 1) all four WiFi devices achiev-
ing the %C≥90% benchmark at SNR≥12.0 dB (SNR≥16.0 dB for GRLVQI), and
2) cross-device average performance of %C≥90% for SNR≥10.0 dB (SNR≥12.0 dB
for GRLVQI). The MDA/ML and GRLVQI cross-device averages are shown overlaid
in Fig. 4.24 to enable direct comparison. By comparison with full-dimensional results
in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2, both methods reflect an approximate 3.0 dB per-
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Figure 4.22: Gabor T-F responses for NC=4 WiFi devices: Rectangular patches iden-
tify regions containing the highest ranked 10% (Top 36) features. One representative
response shown per device [73].
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formance degradation using DRA; however, the dimensionally reduced results only
required approximately one-tenth the original computation time.
4.2.4 WiFi Device ID Verification. Device ID verification results are pre-
sented for the four 802.11a WiFi devices (ID #s N4U9, N4UD, N4UW, N4PX) us-
ing dimensionally reduced GT fingerprints. The features were ranked and selected
using DRA Method #3 and the device ID verification process implemented per
Section 3.5.2. Figure 4.25 shows verification ROC curves in which the arbitrary
EER≤10% benchmark is met or exceeded for all NAC=4 Authorized WiFi devices at
SNR=15.0 dB. Devices N4UD and N4U9 provided best and worst case performance
of EER≈0.009% and EER≈0.101%, respectively. Figure 4.26 shows the ROC curves
associated with the WiFi devices that resulted in the best (Fig. 4.26(a)) and worst
(Fig. 4.26(b)) case individual classification performance for SNR=[12.0, 15.0, 18.0] dB.
The poorest performance is associated with WiFi device N4U9 which resulted in
EER≈0.2% at SNR=12.0 dB. Additional results for the N4UW and N4PX WiFi
devices at SNR=[12.0, 15.0, 18.0] dB are presented in Fig. A.22 of Appendix A.2.
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(a) GRLVQI Processing [73]
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Figure 4.23: WiFi GRLVQI and MDA/ML classification performance for NC=4 de-
vices using the Top 36 features selected with DRA Method #3 per (3.19).
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Figure 4.24: Overlay of GRLVQI and MDA/ML average cross-device 802.11a WiFi
performances from Fig. 4.23. Results for GT RF-DNA features for NC=4 devices
using the Top 36 features selected with DRA Method #3 per (3.19).
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Figure 4.25: GRLVQI verification ROC curves for NAC=4 Authorized WiFi devices
using a dimensionally reduced (top 36) Gabor Transform (GT) RF-DNA feature set
at SNR=15.0 dB [73].
86
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
EER
T
ru
e
V
er
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
R
a
te
(T
V
R
)
False Verification Rate (FVR)
SNR = 12 dB
SNR = 15 dB
SNR = 18 dB
(a) Best Case: Device ID #N4UD.
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(b) Worst Case: Device ID #N4U9.
Figure 4.26: GRLVQI verification ROC curves for best case and worst case WiFi
devices using a reduced dimensional Gabor Transform (GT) RF-DNA feature set at
SNR=[12.0, 15.0, 18.0] dB [73].
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4.3 Multipath Impact on Classification
Results are presented here for a “first-look” investigation into the impact of
multipath on device classification performance. For this investigation, 802.11a WiFi
preamble responses were used given that 1) a considerable amount of previous research
has been completed using the 8012.11a signal [54,56,57,67,73,81,82,84,94], and 2) a
comparative performance baseline was established in Section 4.2. Based on results in
Fig. 4.17 and Fig. 4.19, RF-DNA fingerprints were generated from both GT and GWT
T-F responses of 802.11a WiFi preambles using the process outlined in Section 2.2.3.
Use of GT and GWT features facilitated the analysis of both linear (GT) and non-
linear (GWT) transform effects on device classification in the presence of multipath.
Motivation: The technical community encouraged consideration of non-
linear feature transforms and suggested that such transforms may provide
greater robustness under multipath conditions.
A Rayleigh faded channel was considered for the initial assessment of multipath
impact on device classification. As illustrated in Fig. 4.27, the channel was modeled
as including the direct path Line-of-Sight (LOS) signal sLOS and a single stationary
reflector producing the reflected signal sREF . Samples of the composite received
multipath signal (sMP ) are given by,
sMP [k] = sLOS[k] + sREF [k] + nb[k], (4.1)
where nb[k] are independent background noise samples and
sREF [k] = ARsLOS[k − kR], (4.2)
with AR (amplitude) and kR (delay) being random channel control parameters.
The Rayleigh fading channel parameters were configured such that the reflected
signal sREF had 1) one-half the power of direct LOS signal sLOS, and 2) an av-
erage time delay of kR≈0.2 µs. The desired channel effects were achieved using
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Figure 4.27: Rayleigh faded multipath channel implemented with a direct path LOS
signal sLOS and a reflected response sREF using Matlab
r ’s rayleighchan.m function.
Matlab
r ’s rayleighchan.m function to create the multipath model. To characterize
the rayleighchan.m function performance prior to using it for multipath assessment,
the function was called 1000 times and each resultant channel model convolved with
the same randomly selected 802.11a WiFi burst response. Figure 4.28(a) shows the
selected LOS sLOS burst response overlayed with 25 sMP multipath signal responses.
Figure 4.28(b) shows the Probability Mass Function (PMF) of the estimated signal
power for each of the received signals and clearly shows the Rayleigh fading effect due
to the generated multipath channel.
Device classification under multipath conditions was performed using the MDA-
/ML classifier described in Section 2.3.1 and Section 3.3.1. As summarized in Ta-
ble 4.1, there were three device classification scenarios considered, including:
1. Both model development (classifier training) and classification are performed
using RF-DNA extracted from signal responses with no multipath present
(M1, T1),
2. Model development using RF-DNA extracted from responses with no mul-
tipath present and subsequent classification using RF-DNA extracted from
signal responses with multipath present , (M1, T2), and
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Figure 4.28: Characterization of Rayleigh faded multipath channel created using
Matlab
r ’s rayleighchan.m function.
90
Table 4.1: Model Development (M) and RF-DNA Fingerprint Testing (T) Conditions
for (M#,T#) Multipath Scenarios.
Variable Description
M1 Models developed using RF-DNA fingerprints
extracted from signal responses with No Mul-
tipath Present.
M2 Models developed using RF-DNA fingerprints
extracted from signal responses with Multi-
path Present.
T1 Classification is performed using RF-DNA test-
ing fingerprints extracted from signal responses
with No Multipath Present.
T2 Classification is performed using RF-DNA test-
ing fingerprints extracted from signal responses
with Multipath Present.
3. Both model development and classification performed using RF-DNA extracted
from signal responses with multipath present , (M2, T2),
where the combinations of model development and classification used for multipath
assessment are denoted herein as (M#,T#) with # taking on values indicated in the
variable column of Table 4.1.
For this initial investigation RF-DNA fingerprint generation, model develop-
ment, and subsequent classification were performed using direct path signals with
scaled background noise nb[k] added to achieve SNR=[9.0, 15.0, 18.0] dB; resultant
MDA/ML classification performance for each of these SNR conditions are shown in
Fig. 4.29 (18.0 dB), Fig. 4.30 (15.0 dB), and Fig. 4.31 (9.0 dB). Notable observations
from these results include:
1. Figure 4.29 presents results for SNR=18.0 dB and reflects an approximate 50%
reduction in average GT-based classification performance when comparing the
(M1,T1) and (M1,T2) scenarios. When comparing scenario one (M1, T1) and
two (M1, T2), there is an approximate 15% and 35% reduction in average classi-
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fication performance when using RF-DNA fingerprints generated from GT and
GWT-based features, respectively. For the (M2,T2) scenario using GWT-based
RF-DNA, average performance degrades by approximately 15% when compared
with the (M1,T1) scenario. However, the average results of scenario three are
consistent between the GT and GWT-based RF-DNA fingerprints. For scenario
two (M1,T2), GWT-based RF-DNA results in an approximate improvement of
15% in average classification performance in comparison to the results when us-
ing GT-based RF-DNA. This suggests that GWT-based RF-DNA fingerprints
provide some multipath resilience.
2. The resiliency of GWT-based RF-DNA fingerprints to multipath is tested by
repeating the above process for SNR=[9.0, 15.0] dB. The SNR=15.0 dB clas-
sification performance results are shown in Fig. 4.30 using both GT and GWT
features under the three (M#,T#) scenarios detailed above. Comparison of
(M1,T1) and (M1,T2) scenario results shows that average classification perfor-
mance is degraded by approximately 45% and 32% for GT and GWT-based
RF-DNA, respectively. For the (M2,T2) scenario, average percent classifica-
tion is consistent across both fingerprint types. As with SNR=18.0 dB re-
sults in Fig. 4.29, GWT-based fingerprinting at SNR=15.0 dB provides an
improvement of 15% when compared with GT-based classification results for
the (M1,T2) scenario and demonstrates the resiliency of GWT RF-DNA under
multipath conditions.
3. Figure 4.31 shows results for SNR=9.0 dB. As with the previous two investi-
gated SNRs, test scenario two (M1,T2) results in a degradation of performance
versus that of scenario one (M1,T1) for both fingerprint generation techniques.
However, the scenario two GWT-based average classification performance re-
sults in only a marginal improvement (approximately 2%) over that of the
GT-based results. Test scenario three remains consistent between the GT and
GWT-based RF-DNA average classification results and provides marginal im-
provement over the (M1,T2) scenario. These results and those of test scenario
92
two suggests that the multipath resiliency benefits of the non-linear GWT are
minimized/lost as SNR degrades.
4. When comparing the results presented in Fig. 4.29, Fig. 4.30, and Fig. 4.31,
it is apparent that as SNR degrades the benefits of non-linear GWT-based
features, with respect to classification performance, are diminished. This is not
only the case when comparing GT-based results to those of the GWT, but also
when comparing scenario one to two across and within T-F RF-DNA fingerprint
generation techniques. Lastly, training and classification performed on RF-
DNA fingerprints, generated from signals, in which multipath is present proves
beneficial to classifier performance when compared to training the classifier using
RF-DNA fingerprints without the presence of multipath.
Observation: Use of non-linear GWT features is generally more robust
at higher SNR but yields comparable performance to linear GT features
when used at lower SNR.
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Figure 4.29: MDA/ML multipath assessment using GT (linear) and GWT (non-
linear) 802.11 WiFi features with and without multipath present at SNR=18.0 dB.
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Figure 4.30: MDA/ML multipath assessment using GT (linear) and GWT (non-
linear) 802.11 WiFi features with and without multipath present at SNR=15.0 dB.
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Figure 4.31: MDA/ML multipath assessment using GT (linear) and GWT (non-
linear) 802.11 WiFi features with and without multipath present at SNR=9.0 dB.
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V. Conclusions
T
his chapter provides a comprehensive summary of key research activities, find-
ings, and recommendations for future research.
5.1 Research Summary
Opportunistic “hackers” continue to gain unauthorized access to wireless net-
works and their criminal activities are projected to continue as new technologies
emerge [10,11,15]. The pervasiveness of communication standards based on Orthogo-
nal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), e.g., IEEE 802.11a/g Wireless Fidelity
(WiFi), IEEE 802.16e Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX),
and 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE), increases the threat of unauthorized access
which remains a concern for OFDM-based wireless networks. This concern becomes
even greater when considering that some of these technologies are being deployed
to form critical links in larger system architectures such as Smart Grid, Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), next generation airport communications,
and as backbone/backhaul elements for cloud computing [28, 32, 37, 61, 91]. Similar
to 802.11 WiFi wireless networks, the network architectures of WiMAX and LTE are
functionally dependent upon Wireless Access Points (WAP) which have been iden-
tified as one of the top 10 IT security threats [2]–the motivation for this research
addressing WAP security enhancement using RF air monitoring with RF “Distinct
Native Attribute” DNA (RF-DNA) fingerprinting.
The seven layer Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model characterizes and
standardizes all services implemented within a wireless network. Conventional mech-
anisms for network security and detection of unauthorized users have been employed
within higher layers of the OSI model, to include the Network (NWK) and Data
Link Layer (DLL). Previous research in [17, 60, 65, 78, 85, 96] focused on developing
bit-level security mechanisms for detecting and mitigating unauthorized network ac-
cess. Thus, by design these bit-level techniques overlook inherent Physical (PHY)
layer information that is available at WAP “doorways” through which a majority
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of criminal activity occurs. Indifference to PHY layer information neglects poten-
tially discriminating information that is contained within all wireless network RF
emissions, regardless if such emissions are from authorized or unauthorized devices–
reliable discrimination of friend-or-foe devices enhances network security by reliable
granting access to authorized users while detecting and countering spoofing attacks
of unauthorized users.
RF fingerprinting is one PHY layer technique that leverages inherent discrimi-
nating information within wireless RF emissions. This is accomplished by exploiting
features that are unique and difficult to counterfeit, i.e., features that are inadver-
tently imparted onto the RF waveform by the hardware components that consti-
tute the wireless device. A substantial amount of research has been conducted in
the area of RF fingerprinting over the past two decades [23–25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 36, 38–
41, 44, 47, 49, 54, 56–58, 67, 71, 74–76, 81, 84, 86, 88, 89, 93–95]. Recent related work
in [44,45,47,56–58,71–73,76,81,93,94] focused on PHY layer exploitation using RF-
DNA extracted from selected portions of intentionally modulated signal responses.
The RF-DNA attributes are 1) adequately “distinct” to enable persistent cross-device
discrimination, and 2) “native” in that the hardware implementation, component
type, manufacturing processes and/or environmental interaction variations induce
unique unintentional “coloration” on the intentional modulation features–inherent
RF-DNA features are sufficiently unique to enable human-like device hardware dis-
crimination.
While a considerable amount of RF-DNA fingerprinting research had been con-
ducted previously, there remained a need at the onset of this research to improve the
experimental-to-operational transition potential of RF-DNA fingerprinting and facil-
itate successful fielding of a system to provide reliable and robust PHY layer security
augmentation. Such a security system must be able to discriminate between 1) devices
from different manufacturers (cross-manufacturer), 2) dissimilar model devices from
the same manufacturer (cross-model), and 3) like model devices from the same manu-
facturer (the most challenging serial number discrimination case [44,47,57,76,93,94]).
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The security system must also be able to resolve a given device’s bit-level credentials
(MAC address, IMEI number, SIM Number, and/or ESN) and RF-DNA fingerprints
with the stored reference model associated with the claimed bit-level credentials. This
device ID verification must be performed in a reliable, timely manner for authorized
devices while at the same time detecting the presence of unauthorized rogue devices
attempting to illegitimately gain network access.
5.2 Research Contribution Areas
As summarized below, several important research contributions were made to
RF-DNA fingerprinting that enhance its experimental-to-operational transition po-
tential. These contributions include:
5.2.1 2D Gabor-Based RF-DNA. One approach for improving device clas-
sification performance is the discovery of a more powerful feature set using a given
classifier, where increased power is indicated by either 1) requiring a lower SNR to
achieve a given classification level, or 2) achieving a higher classification level for a
given SNR. The 802.11a WiFi work by Klein in [56–58] was AFIT’s first success-
ful transition from 1D Time/Spectral Domain (TD/SD) feature sets to a 2D joint
Time-Frequency (T-F) feature set derived from Dual-Tree Complex Wavelet Trans-
form (DT-CWT) coefficients. Klein’s results for an MDA/ML classifier showed that
2D DT-CWT features were indeed superior with a relative performance “gain” (re-
duction in required SNR to achieve a given classification accuracy) of Gp≈6.0 dB
(TD) and Gp≈-3.0 dB (SD) realized for an arbitrary %C≥90% performance bench-
mark [56–58,94].
Gabor Transform (GT) and Gabor-Wigner Transform (GWT) features are in-
troduced here as 2D alternatives to the DT-CWT. Performance was assessed here
for both MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers using GT/GWT RF-DNA feature sets.
For the same 802.11a WiFi devices used by Klein in [56–58], average MDA/ML clas-
sification performance using full-dimensional (Nf=363 features) GT-based RF-DNA
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fingerprints achieved the %C≥90% benchmark for SNR≥9.0 dB. This corresponds to
performance gains of Gp≈[9.5, 16.6, 9.1, 7.1] dB for GWT, TD, SD, and DT-CWT-
based RF-DNA fingerprinting, respectively–RF-DNA fingerprints derived from 2D
GT-based features are indeed superior to previous 1D and 2D feature sets [71–73,76].
Results for 802.16e WiMAX Mobile Subscriber (MS) devices were equally sig-
nificant, with MDA/ML classifier performance using full dimensional (Nf=204 fea-
tures) GT-based RF-DNA fingerprints reaching the arbitrary %C≥90% benchmark
for SNR≥6.5 dB and achieving performance gains of Gp≈[4.9, 8.1, 20.0] relative
to GWT, TD, and SD RF-DNA fingerprints, respectively [71, 76]. Corresponding
GRLVQI classifier results using the same input feature set were marginally poorer,
with the arbitrary %C≥90% benchmark reached at SNR≥10.0 dB and apprecia-
ble gains of Gp≈[6.5, 12.5] dB achieved for GWT and TD RF-DNA fingerprints,
respectively [45, 72, 73]. Related research using other signal types suggests that
SNR=10.0 dB is achievable in operational environments such that implementation of
GRLVQI processing is feasible. Of equal importance, the inherent feature relevance
indication provided by GRLVQI overcomes a major MDA/ML limitation and enables
efficient processing using dimensionally reduced feature sets–the next highlighted re-
search contribution.
5.2.2 Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA). Although the MDA/ML
classifier performed favorably in previous works and for generating baseline results un-
der this research, it has one major limitation that impacts its potential for experimental-
to-operational transition–it lacks a mechanism for relating input feature impact to the
final classification decision. This limitation inhibits the ability to retain or discard a
given feature, based upon its relevance to classification, for future feature generation
and subsequent classification. The ability to select and retain a most relevant set of
RF-DNA features, while maintaining a given classification accuracy, is assessed here
using Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA). The dimensionally reduced feature
set requires fewer computational resources (processing power, memory, etc.) which
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increases the experimental-to-operational transition potential. The MDA/ML limi-
tation is overcome here using GRLVQI which inherently develops a feature relevance
ranking for each RF-DNA input feature during classifier training.
Given GRLVQI relevance rankings, the effectiveness of four DRA feature selec-
tion methods were investigated under this research, including [45,72,73]:
i. DRA Method #1: Use the highest ranked relevance values produced at a single
SNR to evaluate classification performance at all SNR per equation (3.17).
ii. DRA Method #2: Use the highest ranked relevance values for each investigated
SNR to assess classification performance at the same SNR per equation (3.18).
iii. DRA Method #3: Use the highest ranked relevance values based on the average
relevance rankings computed across all investigated SNR per equation (3.19).
iv. DRA Method #4: Use the union of highest ranked relevance values across all
SNR considered per equation (3.20).
Results in Section 4.1.3 and Section 4.2.3 show that for DRA≈90% (90% of full-
dimensional RF-DNA input features discarded), statistically equivalent classification
performance is achieved for a 10× reduction in computation time [45, 72, 73]. Of the
four methods considered, DRA Method #3 resulted in the best overall classification
performance for all feature sets (TD, SD, GT, and GWT) and range of SNR consid-
ered. A key advantage of DRA Method #3 is that it provides a means for determining
a single, SNR independent set of features that can be applied without requiring real-
time burst SNR estimates in operational network security systems. Classification
results using DRA feature sets with each of the classifiers include:
1. For 802.16e WiMAX devices with dimensionally reduced feature sets (Nf=20 of
204 total features) selected using DRA Method #3: 1) the MDA/ML classifier
achieved individual device classification accuracies of %C≥80% for five of the
six devices at SNR≥9.0 dB, and 2) the GRVLQI classifier achieved %C≥80%
for all six devices at SNR≥15.0 dB.
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2. For 802.11a WiFi devices with dimensionally reduced feature sets (Nf=36 of
363 total features) selected using DRA Method #3: 1) the MDA/ML classi-
fier achieved the arbitrary %C≥90% benchmark at SNR≥12.0 dB, and 2) the
GRVLQI classifier achieved the arbitrary %C≥90% benchmark is achieved for
SNR≥16.0 dB.
5.2.3 Device ID Verification. A majority of prior related RF-DNA finger-
printing work predominantly focused on device classification (a one-to-many looks
“most like” assessment) [44,47,57,74–76,81,93,94]. In this case, the network security
system uses a similarity measure to compare an unknown device’s “challenge” RF-
DNA fingerprint to stored reference models associated with each of the NAC known/-
authorized network devices. The security system then declares the unknown device
as being one the specific authorized devices based on the reference model providing
the “best” match to the current “challenge” fingerprint(s). This declaration is made
regardless of whether or not the “challenge” fingerprints originate from an autho-
rized or unauthorized device. This “best” match assignment may actually be a poor
match and creates the opportunity for “rogue” devices, whose RF-DNA closely resem-
bles that of an authorized device, to gain access to the unauthorized network access.
Furthermore, the one-to-many device classification approach may not be feasible in
applications where the network is comprised of a large number of devices or a network
in which users enter and leave frequently or randomly.
This research adopted the MDA/ML-based verification methods used for unin-
tentional emissions in [19, 20] and expanded their applicability to include: 1) inten-
tional wireless emissions, and 2) implementation with a GRLVQI classifier [71–73]. As
designated in [19,20] and maintained here, device ID verification (a one-to-one looks
“how much” like assessment) involves a comparison between an unknown device’s
“challenge” fingerprint(s) and a stored reference model affiliated with the claimed
bit-level identity being presented by the device. This comparison is made using sim-
ilarity measures (verification test statistics) that are based on Bayesian posterior
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probabilities and geometric measures. The geometric measures considered under this
research included Euclidean Distance, Normalized Euclidean Distance, Spatial Angle,
and the product of Spatial Angle and Normalized Euclidean Distance.
Device ID verification performance using 802.16e WiMAX devices with MDA/ML-
based Bayesian posterior probabilities included achieving an arbitrary Equal Error
Rate (EER) of EER≤10% benchmark for all six authorized devices at SNR=6.0 dB.
For GRLVQI-based geometric measures, the product of Spatial Angle and Normalized
Euclidean Distance proved superior with all six authorized WiMAX devices achiev-
ing the arbitrary EER≤10% benchmark at SNR=18.0 dB. To simulate a network
spoofing attack, GRLVQI-based verification was performed using six unauthorized
“rogue” WiMAX devices presenting false bit-level credentials matching each of the
authorized device–a total of 36 independent network intrusion attacks via spoofed
bit-level identities. Using the GRLVQI-based Spatial Angle times Normalized Eu-
clidean Distance similarity measure, 35 of 36 attacks were successfully detected, with
EER≤10% (Rogue Rejection Rate RRR≥90%) at SNR=18.0 dB [72].
For completeness, Device ID verification performance was assessed using the
four available 802.11a WiFi devices. This was done using the GRLVQI-based Spatial
Angle times Normalized Euclidean Distance similarity measure. In this case, the arbi-
trary EER≤10% benchmark was achieved for all four authorized 802.11a WiFi devices
at SNR=15.0 dB. Given the limited number of 802.11a devices, rogue rejection was
not assessed and remains an area of interest for future research.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
As outlined in Section 1.2, the decision to investigate Gabor-based RF-DNA
fingerprinting and GRLVQI classification was motivated by two factors, including
1) improving device classification performance relative to previous RF fingerprinting
work [23–25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 36, 38–41, 44, 47, 49, 54, 56–58, 67, 74, 75, 81, 84, 86, 88, 89, 93–
95] and 2) addressing noted shortcomings of the MDA/ML classifier. Relative to
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previous RF fingerprinting work, the utilization and benefits of Gabor-based features
and GRLVQI classification has been acutely demonstrated and well-received within
the technical community [71–73,76]. However, there remains several related topics of
interest that warrant further investigation, including:
1. Alternate Wireless Devices: Demonstration results presented here are based
on experimentally collected IEEE 802.11a WiFi signals from Cisco AIR-CB21G-
A-K9 cards and IEEE 802.16e WiMAX signals from Alvarion BreezeMAX Ex-
treme 5000 WiMAX MS units. There are many other manufacturers of WiFi
and WiMAX subscriber equipment. Additional research could be conducted to
apply techniques developed in this work using emissions from other WiFi (Net-
Gear, Linksys, Etc.) and WiMAX (Motorola, Alcatel, Etc.) user equipment.
Also, Fourth Generation (4G) Long Term Evolution (LTE) is an OFDM-based
wireless standard that is being deployed throughout the world to replace older
Third Generation (3G) Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) stan-
dard. The application of Gabor-based RF-DNA fingerprinting with GRLVQI
classification and verification could be considered for securing LTE and other
4G network architectures employing WAPs.
2. Alternate Classifiers: This work introduced the ANN-based GRLVQI classi-
fier to address shortcomings of earlier work using a Fisher-based MDA/ML clas-
sifier. One of the key GRLVQI advantages exploited under this research, and
which is not supported by MDA/ML, is the capability to determine which input
features are most relevant to overall classification performance. The GRLVQI
classifier implemented here uses a weighted Euclidean distance as the classi-
fication similarity measure. While effective, it is believe that other similarity
measures (e.g., l1-norm, spatial angle, spatial angle times distance, etc.) may
improve upon GRLVQI classification performance. This suggestion is based on
the effectiveness of alternate measures that were used here for demonstrating
reliable device ID verification. Additional research at AFIT suggests that the
Learning From Signals (LFS) classifier may be effective as well given that it per-
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forms consistently with MDA/ML while providing a feature relevance indication
similar to GRLVQI [14,44–47].
3. Alternate Channel Models: The disparity between collected SNRc and anal-
ysis signal SNRA was such that the like-filtered Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) dominated the collected background noise. Thus, the the research re-
sults are most consistent with what is expected for AWGN channel conditions.
The signal collection environment and methodology could be modified such that
actual SNRc variation is induced and analysis signal generation removed. Ad-
ditionally, only the impact of a single multipath reflector was considered to
provide a preliminary assessment of performance using linear (GT) and non-
linear (GWT) features. The GWT feature set provided only modest additional
robustness to simple multipath and more complex multipath models (e.g., typ-
ical urban, rural, etc.) should be considered to sufficiently address technical
community “encouragement” and provide much needed demonstration results.
4. Network/Cross-Layer Integration: This work has demonstrated the appli-
cability of RF-DNA fingerprinting for supporting one-to-one device ID verifica-
tion as well as one-to-many device classification. Specifically, the PHY-based
methods herein support envisioned bit-level security augmentation using RF
air monitoring under network (NWK) control at WAPs. The effectiveness of
an integrated PHY-NWK cross-layer framework remains to be demonstrated
and could be pursued. This cross-layer coordination could be used to provide
one-to-one Multi-Factor Verification of authorized network devices.
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Appendix A. Additional Results
T
his appendix contains the additional results not presented in Chapter IV. These
additional results are presented here in the same order as presented in the
document above.
A.1 WiMAX Device ID Verification
Here are the device verification results for the remaining four Authorized and
five Rogue WiMAX MS devices.
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Figure A.1: ROC curves and EER for four WiMAX MS devices at SNR=[0, 3, 6] dB
using an a posterior probability verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.2: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MS9993 at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv
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Figure A.3: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSC2FF at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.4: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAB9 at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.5: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAC5 at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.6: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDDBF at
SNR=18 dB using a Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.7: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MS9993 at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.8: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSC2FF at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.9: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAB9 at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.10: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAC5 at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.11: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDDBF at
SNR=18 dB using a Normalized Euclidean Distance verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.12: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MS9993 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.13: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSC2FF at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.14: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAB9 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.15: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAC5 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.16: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDDBF at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle verification test statistic zv.
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Figure A.17: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MS9993 at
SNR=18 dB using the a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Distance veri-
fication test statistic zv.
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Figure A.18: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSC2FF at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv.
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Figure A.19: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAB9 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv.
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Figure A.20: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDAC5 at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv.
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Figure A.21: ROC curves and EER for Rogue WiMAX MS device MSDDBF at
SNR=18 dB using a Spatial Angle-times-Normalized Euclidean Distance verification
test statistic zv.
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A.2 WiFi Device ID Verification
Here are the device verification results for WiFi devices, N4UW and N4PX, not
shown in Section 4.2.4.
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(a) WiFi device: N4UW.
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(b) WiFi device: N4PX.
Figure A.22: ROC curves and EER for N4UW and N4PX WiFi devices at
SNRA=[12, 15, 18] dB.
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